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ABSTRACT 
International delegates at the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) are 
nearing completion of a pair of ambitious treaties 
that would provide for exclusive rights in 
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural 
expression, respectively. This Article provides 
the first detailed analysis and critique of the draft 
treaties. Proponents of such intangible heritage 
rights often invoke rationales of both cultural 
integrity and economic justice to justify them. 
Yet, pursuing these distinct rationales dictates 
conflicting imperatives. To resolve this conflict, 
this Article argues for greater differentiation 
between the draft treaties based on subject matter. 
Just as patents and copyrights receive very 
different protection in conventional intellectual 
property regimes, so too, the WIPO treaties 
should differentiate much more sharply between 
technical knowledge and cultural expression. 
This Article provides a blueprint for 
disaggregating the normative interests most 
salient in each context and tailoring protections 
according! y. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Should the intangible heritage of indigenous cultures be 
subject to intellectual property rights? While scholars have 
long debated this question, 1 fresh controversies have rekindled 
the debate. In 2015, college campuses across the United States 
confronted issues of cultural appropriation around Halloween. 2 
High-profile films such as The Lone Ranger3 and the Twilight4 
1 For a sampling of viewpoints sympathetic to indigenous heritage rights, 
see generally Kristen A Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1022 (2009); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Romance of the 
Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004); Angela R. Riley, "Straight 
Stealing": Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 
80 WASH. L. REv. 69 (2005); Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: 
An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
299 (2002); Christine H. Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: 
Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1997). For more 
skeptical perspectives, see generally Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property 
Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REv. 809, 875-80 (2010); 
Naomi Mezey, The Paradox of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
2004 (2007); Stephen Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for 
Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 37 (2009); Sean A. Pager, Folklore 2.0: Preservation through 
Innovation, 2012 Utah L. Rev. 1835; MICHAEL BROWN, WHO OWNS 
NATIVE CULTURE (2004). 
2 Kirk Johnson, Halloween Costume Correctness on Campus: Feel Free to 
Be You, but Not Me, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 30, 2015; Liam Stacknov, 
Yale's Halloween Advice Stokes a Racially Charged Debate, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Nov. 09, 2015; see also Cathy Young, To The New Culture Cops, 
Everything Is Appropriation, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https:/ /www. washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/20 15/08/21/to-the-
new -culture-cops-everything-is-appropriation!. While these controversies 
were not focused on appropriation of intangible heritage/traditional cultures 
per se, such issues were central to the debate. 
3 While the brutal realities that attended European settlement of Indian lands 
have long rendered American Westerns problematic as a film genre, the 
2013 version of the Lone Ranger promised a more sympathetic portrait of 
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series sparked their own charges of cultural theft and misuse of 
Native American heritage. 5 Similarly, in 2014, Pharrell 
Native American culture than its antecedents. Even so, critics saw the 
legacy of American genocidal conquest as compounded by cultural 
imperialism implicit in the film itself. See Sam Adams, Why the Lone 
Ranger's Anachronisms Make Its History Lessons Hard to Swallow, 
INDIEWIRE (July 5, 2013, 2:32 PM), 
http ://blo gs. indiewire. com/criticwire/lone-ranger-racism-tonto-comanche-
history-anachronism. The casting of an ostensibly non-Indian actor, Johnny 
Depp, as the Lone Ranger's sidekick Tonto added a further layer of 
controversy. See Angela Aleiss, Johnny Depp, the 'Indian': Is He or Isn't 
He?, ACADEMIA.EDU (June 17, 2013), 
http://www.academia.edu/3787152/Johnny_Depp_the_Indian_Is_He_or_Is 
nt_He. Canadian Mohawk actor Jay Silverheels portrayed the Tonto 
character in the 1950s TV series, and many felt that the role in the new film 
should have gone to an Indian. See id. Depp's outlandish costume, face-
paint, and stereotypical character traits also garnered widespread criticism 
in the Native community. See, e.g., Aisha Harris, Johnny Depp's Tonto: 
Not as Racist as You Might Think. But Still Kind of Racist, SLATE (July 3, 
2013), 
http://www. slate.com/blogs/browbeat/20 13/07/03/johnny _depp_as_tonto_lo 
ne_ranger_movie_pushes_against_racism_but_reinforces.html; Lily 
Rothman, Johnny Depp as Tonto: Is the Lone Ranger Racist, TIME (July 3, 
20 13), http://entertainment. time.com/20 13/07/03/johnny -depp-as-tonto-is-
the-lone-ranger-racist/. 
4 Twilight films series, presented a sensationalized and arguably defamatory 
version of Quileute Indian mythology. See Kristen A. Carpenter et al., 
Clarifying Cultural Property, 17 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 581, 581-82 
(2010); Cultural Theft in Twilight, TRUTH VERSUS TWILIGHT, 
http://www. burkemuseum. org/static/truth_ vs _twilight/facts-03. php. 
5 These were hardly the first films to raise issues around misappropriation of 
Native American culture. See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 326 (questioning 
whether non-Indians are entitled to tell "native stories"). Nor are Native 
Americans the only victims. Disney has courted controversies around the 
world for its commercial exploitation of indigenous folklore. See e.g., 
Mulan Musings, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 25, 2006), 
http://www .chinadaily.com.cn/bw/2006-12/25/content_766454.htm (noting 
controversy over Disney film based on a Chinese folktale); Cindy Y. 
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Williams became the latest in a series of celebrities to face 
criticism for donning a Native American feather headdress. 6 
Controversies over misappropriation of indigenous culture 
have also arisen with regard to music, 7 literature, 8 fashion, 9 
Rodriguez, Day of the Dead Trademark Request Draws Backlash for 
Disney, CNN.COM (May 11, 2013), 
http://www .cnn.com/20 13/05/1 0/us/disney -trademark -day -dead; Sam 
Heydt, Cinematic Essentialism, Social Hegemony, and Walt Disney's 
Aladdin, W ORDPRESS (Jan. 6, 201 0), 
http://samheydt.wordpress.com/cinematic-essentialism-social-hegemony-
and-walt-disneys-aladdin/; Hokulei Lindsey, Responsibility with 
Accountability: The Birth of a Strategy to Protect Kanaka Maoli 
Traditional Knowledge, 48 How. L.J. 763, 766-68 (2005) (describing 
controversial use of traditional Hawaiian name chants in Disney's 2002 
movie, Lila & Stitch). 
6 See Jon Blistein, Pharrell Apologizes for Wearing Headdress on Magazine 
Cover, ROLLING STONE (June 5, 2014), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/pharrell-apologizes-for-wearing-
headdress-on-magazine-cover-20140605. Many American Indians consider 
feather headdresses as the sacred preserve of tribal chiefs, inappropriate for 
outsiders to wear. !d. 
7 See Riley, supra note 1, at 70-72 (describing misappropriation of Navajo 
song by OutKast at 2004 Grammy Awards); see also Angela Riley, 
Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in 
Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 175-77 
(2000) (describing Enigma's misappropriation of Taiwanese indigenous 
melody in hit single, "Return to Innocence"). 
8 See Rosemary J. Coombe, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES 208-09 (1998) (describing debate over cultural appropriation 
by Canadian writers). 
9 See Lisa Hix, Why the 'Native' Fashion Trend Is Pissing Off Real Native 
Americans, COLLECTORS WEEKLY (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/why-the-native-fashion-trend-is-
pissing-off-real-native-americans/; see also Navajo Nation v. Urban 
Outfitters, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D.N.M. 2013) (challenge to 
Urban Outfitters' "Navajo" product line). 
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handicrafts, 10 ice skating, 11 and many other contexts. 12 
Meanwhile, the debate over Native American mascots in 
professional and collegiate sports shows such controversies 
increasingly moving outside the realm of politics to assume a 
legal guise. 13 The cancellation of the Washington Red skins' 
trademark represents only the latest victory in a campaign 
against the perceived appropriation of Native American 
culture. 14 
10 See Farley, supra note 1, at 4-7 (describing misappropnat10n of 
Australian aboriginal design in mass-produced carpets); id. at 1 (describing 
inauthentic imitations of Navajo rug patterns made overseas); see generally 
William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009 (2001) 
(examining U.S. statutory regime proscribing mislabeling of "Indian" 
handicrafts). 
11 Eric Felten, On Thin Ice: Two Russians Skate off the Reservation: A Loin-
Clothed Homage to Aboriginal Peoples Backfires, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 
2010), 
10001424052748704878904575031242199 
981602. 
12 See Farley, supra note 1, at 8 ("Indigenous motifs are used to sell 
everything from Japanese automobiles like the Mazda Navajo to Barbie 
dolls to back-to-school clothes .... [W]e are seeing indigenous designs 
more often and in new contexts."); see also Carpenter et al., supra note 1, at 
1024 n.l (describing Zia pueblo's dispute with New Mexico over Zia sun 
symbol). 
13 See e.g., Carpenter et. al., supra note 1, at 1106 (describing NCAA's 
formal process for arbitrating disputes over Indian mascots); Davidson v. 
State ex rel. N. Dakota State Bd. of Higher Educ., 781 N.W.2d 72, 73 (N.D. 
2010). 
14 See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., Cancellation No. 92046185 
(T.T.A.B. June 18, 2014) (cancelling the Redskins trademark and labeling 
the name as disparaging). Technically, the challenge to the "Redskins" 
mark was based on its disparaging nature; far from considering "redskins" 
part of their culture, Native Americans reject it as an offensive, racist 
epithet. Yet, the Lanham Act's prohibition against trademark 
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Indigenous peoples are asserting claims to control and 
profit from use of their intangible heritage with increasing 
success around the world. 15 Moreover, such claims are not 
limited to cultural expression; they also embrace indigenous 
technologies, know-how, and bio-resources. 16 Collectively, 
such intangible heritage claims have been considered under the 
rubric of "traditional knowledge" rights. A global campaign to 
instantiate exclusive rights in traditional knowledge and 
cultural expression as bedrock norms of world intellectual 
property law has made steady progress. 17 After years of effort, 
disparagement merely provided the vehicle for what was in reality a broader 
challenge to use of indigenous iconography. The connection to this broader 
campaign can be seen in reports that the Cleveland Indians' "Chief Wahoo" 
may be next on the chopping block. See Phil Helsel, Native Groups Look to 
Retire the Cleveland Indians' Chief Wahoo, NBCNEWS, (June 23, 2014), 
cleveland-indians-chief-wahoo-nl37176. 
15 See, e.g., Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Party, Ltd. (1994) 54 FCR 240, 240 
(Austl.); Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 IPR 481; Dec. 
17, 2003 Decision of the Beijing Higher People's Court in Case No. 246 
(2003) (final) [2006] 37 IIC, 482-487; Andrew Osborn, Maoris Win Lego 
Battle, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2001); Mulan Musings, supra note 5 
(describing protection of Chinese kung-fu through Shaolin trademark). 
16 See Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict over the 
Commodification of Life, 22 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 279, 283-86 (1999); 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: A Bottom-up 
Approach to Development, WIPO MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 18, 20. 
17 See Justin Hughes, Traditional Knowledge, Cultural Expression, and the 
Siren's Call of Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1215, 1229-37 (2012) 
(providing history of global developments in TK law). For accounts of TK 
legislation enacted at the national level, see, e.g., Owen Dean, Inside Views: 
The Mad Hatter in Wonderland: South Africa's New TK Bill, INTELL. PROP. 
WATCH (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/2011/ll/08/the-mad-
Lorraine V. 
Aragon & James Leach, Arts and Owners: Intellectual Property Law and 
the Politics of Scale in Indonesian Arts, 35 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 607, 615 
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international delegates to the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) in Geneva have moved to complete a 
pair of ambitious treaties that would accomplish this goal. 18 
This Article makes several contributions to the 
traditional knowledge debate. First, it provides the first 
detailed analysis and critique of the draft WIPO treaties. 
Second, it offers a novel theoretical account of the conflicting 
imperatives posed by two of the leading rationales supporting 
TK rights: cultural integrity and economic justice. Third, to 
resolve these conflicts, the Article advances a normative 
argument for greater differentiation between the two draft 
treaties based on subject matter. Finally, the Article explores 
the flawed dynamics of WIPO's treaty drafting process that 
impede such differentiation. 
(2008); DAPHNE ZOGRAFOS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL 
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS 7-18 (2010). 
18 See generally World Intellectual Property Organization, The Protection of 
Traditional Cultural Expressions: Draft Articles, 28th Sess., 
WIPO/GRTKJIC/28/6 (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter TCE Treaty]; World 
Intellectual Property Organization, The Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge: Draft Articles, 28th Sess., WIPO/GRTKFGRTKJIC/28/5 (June 
2, 2014) [hereinafter TK Treaty]. At least, the delegates were poised to 
complete the treaties as of summer, 2014, with developing countries calling 
for a final diplomatic conference to conclude the negotiation process. See 
Catherine Saez, WIPO Delegates to "Rationalize" Draft Texts To Protect 
GR, TK, Folklore, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.ip-
A failure to reach consensus on the treaty drafting end-
game has brought a temporary halt to negotiations. See Catherine Saez, 
WIPO Seminar Could Rekindle Discussions on Genetic Resources, TK, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.ip-
resources-tk/. The dynamics of WIPO negotiations are explored further 
infra in Part IV. 
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On its face, WIPO's treaty-drafting has already 
bifurcated along subject matter lines, dividing rights in 
traditional cultural expression (TCE or folklore) from 
protection of technical know-how (technical TK or traditional 
knowledge sensu stricto). 19 Traditional dances, melodies, 
designs, legends, and the like are to be governed by one treaty; 
traditional folk medicines, canoe-building techniques, etc. by 
another. 20 Yet, despite this formal distinction, the two draft 
treaties overlap considerably in the legal protections they 
would afford. 21 Rather than tailoring rights narrowly to fit 
each context, the treaties eschew selectivity in favor of full 
spectrum coverage: Traditional communities would effectively 
gain broad property rights in their intangible heritage 
enforceable in perpetuity against the entire world. 
This Article criticizes the WIPO treaties for their over-
inclusive scope. It argues that the expansive and 
undifferentiated set of rights that the draft treaties confer masks 
19 See Hughes, supra note 17, at 1216-17 (exploring the convoluted 
terminology used in the TK negotiations and arguing that it is "itself 
indicative of definitional instabilities in this field"). A third treaty on 
genetic resources governs tangible bio-resources rather than the intangible 
knowledge or expression of indigenous peoples. As this third treaty is not 
concerned with intellectual property as such, it will not be addressed here 
directly. However, the recommendations made here for technical TK 
largely apply to that treaty as well. 
20 The forms of folkloric expression covered by the TCE treaty roughly 
correspond to the subject matter regulated by copyright law. By contrast, 
technical forms of traditional knowledge (sometimes referred to as TK 
sensu stricto) have a technological, utilitarian bent analogous to patentable 
subject matter. See id. at 1218. Hughes offers a helpful example to further 
illustrate the difference: "[A] rain dance is TCE, but if the rain dance 
works-if it actually triggers precipitation in a cause and effect 
relationship-it is also TK." !d. 
21 See infra notes 27-65 and accompanying text. 
Vol. 20 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & 
TECHNOLOGY 
No. 01 
2016 Pager, Traditional Knowledge Rights and Wrongs 92 
internal contradictions that are potentially harmful. Pursuing 
such flawed treaties will result in one of two outcomes: Either 
the internal contradictions will result in misguided policies that 
do actual harm, or the treaties will amount to a costly exercise 
in empty symbolism, dragged down by the weight of their 
overreaching ambition-assuming they can be completed at all. 
Indeed, the collapse of TK negotiations in late 2014 should 
serve as a wake-up call22: The hard choices needed to ensure 
viable treaties cannot be deferred indefinitely. 
This Article offers a roadmap to move forward. As a 
starting point, the current, all-inclusive approach of the draft 
treaties should be jettisoned in favor of a more discriminating 
approach that unpacks the separate normative interests that 
traditional knowledge rights serve: In particular, the 
implications of a cultural integrity rationale must be 
distinguished from those of economic justice. These 
distinctions can, in tum, be mapped onto differences in subject-
matter: Drawing sharper distinctions between cultural 
expression and technical knowledge opens the way to more 
streamlined, narrowly targeted treaties. 
Misappropriation of technical knowledge is unlikely to 
raise much in the way of cultural integrity concerns because 
such knowledge will typically be extracted from the traditional 
cultural context and divested of cultural meaning during the 
commercialization process. However, economic justice 
concerns are likely to be highly salient in this context, 
presenting a strong case for a compensation mechanism to 
ensure that source communities share in the benefits of such 
commercialization. The case for benefit-sharing is further 
bolstered by extrinsic policy interests in global health and 
22 See infra Part IV. 
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environmental sustainability, both of which favor 
compensating source communities for use of their knowledge 
and bio-resources. 23 
When it comes to traditional cultural expressiOn, the 
reciprocal analysis applies. Concerns over cultural integrity 
loom most centrally in this context. By contrast, economic 
justice concerns are less compelling, given the ability of source 
communities to derive benefits from commercialization even in 
the absence of a formal benefit-sharing regime. Moreover, 
analogous extrinsic policy interests do not apply here (or apply 
with much less force). 24 
Accordingly, traditional knowledge negotiators should 
pursue a strategy of normative arbitrage that exploits such 
asymmetries and tailors protection according to the normative 
interests most salient in each context. 25 Just as practical 
innovation receives very different protection from expressive 
art in conventional intellectual property regimes, so too, the 
WIPO treaties should differentiate much more sharply between 
technical knowledge and cultural expression. 
What would emerge is a far more modest package of 
rights, not all of which require transnational effect. A baseline 
comprised of expanded unfair competition norms would supply 
23 See infra Part III -a(2)(b) and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. 
25 This is not to say that TK should replicate the same distinctions present in 
the conventional copyright and patent systems. Indeed, in one respect the 
approach advocated here would lead to an inverse outcome: whereas global 
copyright law is a much more globally harmonized system than patent law 
with reciprocal protection conferred automatically without formalities, this 
Article advocates such seamless global protection for technical TK, while 
localizing protection for traditional cultural expression. 
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a common starting point that would regulate informed consent, 
secrecy, and false designation concerns. 26 Beyond this 
baseline, however, both the form of protection afforded to 
traditional knowledge and the extent to which global standards 
would be harmonized should vary according to the subject 
matter. 
A strong case exists for a benefit-sharing mechanism on 
a global scale applicable to technical traditional knowledge. 
The distributional inequalities associated with the status quo 
are particularly skewed, making underscoring the need to 
remedy concerns over unjust enrichment. Moreover, the 
shared global interest in the efficient exploitation of ethno-
biological knowledge combined with the asymmetrical nature 
of the protagonists' negotiating positions makes a benefit-
sharing mechanism desirable from a game-theoretical 
standpoint. Benefit-sharing can be implemented through a 
relatively streamlined liability regime, minimizing the need for 
global governance. Indeed, such benefit-sharing is already 
required under the Convention on Biodiversity. Thus, 
traditional knowledge norm-development here can build upon 
existing implementation efforts. Finally, because cultural 
integrity concerns are relatively attenuated, a liability regime in 
this context is less problematic. 
By contrast, the case for global benefit-sharing with 
respect to traditional cultural expression/folklore is far less 
convincing. The North-South capacity gap is not as acute in 
copyright industries as compared to patent, reducing 
distributive justice concerns. Instead, concerns over cultural 
integrity predominate, requiring a property regime to regulate 
authenticity ex ante. Yet, because the dilutive harm from 
26 See infra notes 85-104 and accompanying text. 
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cultural appropriation largely springs from local uses, there is 
less need for global regulation. Moreover, the contextually 
nuanced, managerial governance required to regulate cultural 
authenticity militates strongly toward localized solutions. 
Eschewing global solutions would allow more contextualized 
tailoring of the rights, of particular importance here given the 
constitutional implications of speech regulation. 
The last part of this Article explores the flawed 
negotiating dynamics that account for WIPO's ill-considered 
"kitchen sink" approach. In particular, it critiques the tendency 
of proponents to situate TK rights within a larger rubric of anti-
imperialism. Imperialism is a bad word that stands for many 
bad things. However, in the traditional knowledge context, 
imperialism serves more as polemical indictment than precise 
diagnosis. By conflating unrelated issues based on flawed 
analogies, such ideological blinders prevent the clarity of 
vision and pragmatic compromises needed to achieve a 
successful outcome. This Article suggests a more constructive 
approach to address the underlying grievances of TK 
demandeurs. 
Part I provides an overview and initial critique of the 
current WIPO Draft Treaties. Part II delves into the theoretical 
rationales that could justify TK protection and shows that two 
of the key rationales-cultural integrity and economic 
justice-stand in tension with one another. Part III argues that 
such tensions can be largely avoided once subject matter is 
taken into account: economic justice is foremost a concern with 
respect to technical traditional knowledge, whereas cultural 
integrity is most salient with respect to traditional cultural 
expression. It argues the treaties should differentiate their 
protection accordingly. Part IV considers why WIPO 
negotiators have resisted such differentiation. It critiques the 
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anti-imperialist lens that has distorted the framing of issues and 
obstructed progress. Part V concludes. 
I. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION 
While this Article focuses on the theoretical case for 
traditional knowledge rights, it may be helpful to begin by 
examining the two WIPO draft treaties that form the backdrop 
to this discussion. As the following analysis demonstrates, the 
treaties combine protections drawn from all the major 
intellectual property rights, incorporating elements of 
copyright, patent, trademark, moral rights, and trade secret law, 
as well as tort law. This robust package of disparate rights 
forms the basis for a robust entitlement that would cover a 
broad swathe of previously public domain materials. 
A. Overview of WIPO Draft Treaties 
Now in its thirteenth year, the WIPO's 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property, Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) has 
made steady progress drafting a pair of comprehensive treaties 
to address TK and TCE, respectively. While the language of 
the treaties remains subject to negotiation, their general 
contours have become clear. Despite differences in several 
specifics, there is a remarkable parallelism across both texts. 
Indeed, identical language appears in many corresponding 
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provisiOns of the treaties. 27 In particular, the scope of 
protection contemplated is equally expansive in each case. 
1. Scope of Protection 
The two treaties contemplate a very similar package of 
protections that Member States will be required to provide to 
treaty beneficiaries with respect to the covered subject-matter. 
Both treaties employ four main types of provisions whose 
capacious and often overlapping terms collectively govern: (a) 
use, (b) informed consent/misappropriation, (c) attribution, and 
(d) compensation. 28 
27 In addition to provisions discussed in detail below, the treaties contain 
very similar provisions under the following headings: Administration of 
Rights, Term of Protection, Formalities, Transboundary Cooperation, 
Transitional Measures, and National Treatment. Compare TK Treaty, arts. 
5, 7-9, 11, 12, with TCE Treaty arts. 4, 6-7, 9, 11. Such parallelism reflects 
a deliberate effort to harmonize the separate drafts. See Catherine Saez, 
WIPO Delegates to "Rationalize" Draft Texts to Protect GR, TK, Folklore, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 7, 2014). 
28 The extent to which these protections apply varies somewhat according to 
the degree to which the protected materials are publicly known. In general, 
the treaties contemplate three different tiers: The full panoply of 
rights/protections would apply to traditional subject matter that is "sacred, 
secret, or otherwise only closely held within" the relevant source 
communities. TCE Treaty, art. 3.1; TK Treaty, art. 3.1. A less inclusive 
standard of protection would apply "where the subject matter is still held ... 
by [the original source communities, but] is publicly available [albeit not] 
widely known, [and is neither] sacred, nor secret." TCE Treaty, art. 3.2; TK 
Treaty, art. 3.2. The weakest protection would apply "where the subject 
matter is publicly available, widely known and in the public domain." TCE 
Treaty, art. 3.3; TK Treaty, art. 3.3. Because the allocation of specific 
rights across these three tiers remains subject to negotiation, the following 
discussion will elide this variability and focus largely on the top tier of 
protection for illustrative purposes. 
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a. Use 
The treaties' use provisiOns would giVe source 
communities the right both to "maintain, control and develop" 
their traditions and to prevent use by others "beyond the 
traditional context." 29 They also require use of the traditions 
"in a manner that respects the cultural norms and practices of 
the beneficiaries."30 The draft TCE treaty contains a further 
prohibition on "use or modification which distorts or mutilates 
a protected traditional cultural expression or that is otherwise 
offensive, derogatory or diminishes its cultural significance to 
the beneficiary."31 
b. Informed Consent & 
Misappropriation 
Both treaties also emphasize that access to and use of 
covered traditions should be "based on prior and informed 
consent or approval and involvement and mutually agreed 
terms." 32 The draft TK treaty contains some additional 
language on misappropnatwn. In one variant, 
misappropriation is defined simply as "access or use of the 
traditional knowledge without prior informed consent." 33 An 
29 TCE Treaty, art. 3.l(a)(i)-(iii); TK Treaty, art. 3.l(a)(i)-(iii). The treaties 
both contain almost identical definitions of "use" to include 
"manufacturing, importing, offering for sale, selling, stocking, or using" the 
respective knowledge or expression "beyond the traditional context." See 
Use of Terms, TCE Treaty & TK Treaty. 
30 TCE Treaty, art. 3.l(b)(iii); TK Treaty, art. 3.l(b) (iii). 
31 TCE Treaty, art. 3.l(a)(v). 
32 TCE Treaty, arts. 3.l(a)(iii), 3.2(d); TK Treaty, arts. 3.l(a)(ii), 3.2(d). 
The treaties do not specify the degree of affirmative disclosures required to 
secure informed consent. 
33 TK Treaty, Use of Terms. 
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alternative version would define misappropriation to cover use 
"where the traditional knowledge has been acquired by the user 
from the holder through improper means or a breach of 
confidence and which results in a violation of nationallaw."34 
This latter variant essentially comprehends misappropriation in 
terms of trade secrecy law. 35 The draft TCE Treaty does not 
address misappropriation as such. However, it does entitle 
source communities to "prevent the unauthorized disclosure 
and fixation" of their traditional cultural expressions. 36 
c. Attribution 
The treaties both require users to properly attribute 
covered traditions to their source communities. 37 Conversely, 
they prohibit "any false or misleading uses of protected 
tradition[s] that suggest endorsement by or linkage with the 
beneficiaries." 38 
34 !d. 
35 Compare id.; art. 3bis (e), with Unif.Trade Secrets Act, § 1. The 
definition further stipulates that acquisition "through lawful means such as 
independent discovery or creation, reading books, receiving sources outside 
of intact traditional communities, reverse engineering, and inadvertent 
disclosure resulting from the holders' failure to take reasonable protection 
measures is not misappropriation." !d.; see also arts. 6.4, 6.5 (containing 
similar exclusion for lawful acquisition). 
36 TCE Treaty, art. 3.l(a)(ii). The TK Treaty similarly targets unauthorized 
disclosure by requiring compensation for "wide diffusion of protection 
subject matter [as] the result of an act of misappropriation." TK Treaty, art. 
4. 
37 TCE Treaty, art. 3.l(b)(i); TK Treaty, art. 3.l(b)(ii). 
38 TCE Treaty, art. 3.l(a)(iv); TK Treaty, art. 3.l(a)(iv). 
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d. Compensation 
The treaties both require users to properly attribute 
covered traditions to their source communities. 39 Conversely, 
they prohibit "any false or misleading uses of protected 
tradition[s] that suggest endorsement by or linkage with the 
beneficiaries. "40 
2. Geographic Scope 
Neither treaty limits the geographic scope within which 
its protections apply. Rather, in addressing their provisions to 
Member States generally with respect to "protected" subject 
matter, they contemplate a fully global system of protection 
that would apply to all traditional knowledge and cultural 
expression within its terms, regardless of its origin. 41 
3. Exceptions 
The draft treaties do allow Member States to grant 
limited exceptions "compatible with fair practice" so long as 
they do not conflict with or unreasonably prejudice the 
interests of beneficiaries and are not "offensive or 
derogatory."42 They also allow for specific exceptions for 
purposes such as teaching, research, archival preservation, or 
other public interests. 43 However, these latter exceptions do 
not apply to traditional subject matter that is sacred, secret or 
39 TCE Treaty, art. 3.1(b)(i); TK Treaty, art. 3.1(b)(ii). 
40 TCE Treaty, art. 3.1(a)(iv); TK Treaty, art. 3.1(a)(iv). 
41 TCE Treaty, art. 3.1; TK Treaty, art 3.1. 
42 TCE Treaty, art. 5.1; TK Treaty, art 6.1. 
43 TCE Treaty, art. 5.3; TK Treaty, art. 6.3. 
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otherwise closely held within indigenous or local 
communities. 44 
4. Term of Protection 
The draft treaties contemplate that the protection of 
traditional knowledge/cultural expression rights "shall last as 
long as the [underlying subject matter] satisfies the criteria of 
eligibility for protection."45 In other words, the treaty 
protections can continue indefinitely. 
5. Subject Matter 
The treaties unsurprisingly diverge in their definitions 
of subject matter: The draft TK treaty applies to traditional 
knowledge, which it defines as "know-how, skills, innovations, 
practices, teaching and learnings."46 The draft TCE treaty 
applies to traditional cultural expression, which it defines as 
"any form of artistic and literary, creative and other spiritual 
expression."47 However, both treaties frame their ambit in 
broad terms to encompass a wide variety of traditional heritage. 
Moreover, they employ essentially the same standard to 
determine what qualifies as "traditional:" To qualify, both 
treaties require that the knowledge or cultural expression, m 
question, be: 
44 TCE Treaty, art. 5.3; TK Treaty, art. 6.3. 
45 TK Treaty, art. 7, TCE Treaty, art. 6. However, alternative language 
under consideration suggests that "Member States may determine the 
appropriate term of protection." !d. 
46 TK Treaty, art. l, Use of Terms. 
47 TCE Treaty, art. l, Use of Terms; see also Use of Terms, nn.l-4 (giving 
examples). 
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(a) "created and maintained in a collective 
context by indigenous peoples and local 
communities or nations"; 
(b) "distinctively associated with the cultural 
heritage or social identity" of the [source 
community]"; 
and 
(c) "transmitted from generation to generation, 
whether consecutively or not."48 
102 
It is worth noting that almost all the material 
encompassed by the draft treaties would be considered in the 
public domain under current intellectual property law. The 
requirement of intergenerational transmission by its own terms 
suggests subject matter beyond the typical life-plus term of 
copyright and well beyond the 20 year exclusivity accorded 
under patent law. 49 And in the absence of commercial use by 
the source community, trademark and-under some 
definitions-trade secret protection are unlikely to apply 
either. 50 The treaties would thus lead to a dramatic and 
arguably unprecedented enclosure of the intangible 
commons. 51 Moreover, a proviso allowing for non-
consecutive, inter-generational transmission enables the revival 
48 TK Treaty, art. 1, TCE Treaty, Art. 1. 
49 See Hughes, supra note 17, at 1229. 
50 See Farley, supra note 1, at 52; THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, sect. 757 
(protecting information "used in one's business"). In addition, trade 
secrecy law requires secrecy and economic value. If the information is 
generally known, readily ascertainable, or lacks demonstrable value, it will 
not qualify. See Farley, supra note 1, at 53. 
51 Pager, supra note 1, at 1875, n.248. 
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of lapsed traditions. Like a springing executory interest, such 
reclaiming of lost know-how or cultural expression could 
trigger disruptive property claims potentially without notice. 
6. Beneficiaries 
Both treaties stipulate that the beneficiaries of 
protection shall be the source communities associated with the 
respective traditions. 52 However, the treaties provide little 
guidance as to what constitutes an "indigenous people" or 
"local communities," nor how their relationship to a particular 
tradition should be established. "Indigenous people" is at least 
a term of art in international law, albeit one whose definitional 
boundaries remain contested. 53 However, "local community" 
represents a novel formulation introduced by the WIPO draft 
treaties that could apply to almost any group. 
Such definitional lacunae are problematic in several 
respects. First, the lack of guidance as to what constitutes a 
qualifying source community leaves the door open for TK 
claimants of all stripes. Rastafarians are already laying claim 
to reggae music. 54 Other potential claimants under the treaties' 
absurdly capacious definitions of eligibility could include 
Louisiana Cajuns (zydeco ), African Americans (blues and 
52 TK Treaty, art. 2; TCE Treaty, art. 2. 
53 See Brown, supra note 1, at 111-12. The third term, "nations," is well 
defined and should pose even less difficulty, although there is no shortage 
of ambiguous cases here as well, including Kurds, Tibetans, Ossetians, 
Chaldeans, and Swabians. 
54 Marcus Gaffe, Exploring Ras Tafari Culture, WIPO MAGAZINE, April, 
2011. Wiccans are likewise mobilizing to defend their cultural heritage. 
See Mark Oppenheimer, Witches Say Beer's O.K., But Lose the Fire and 
Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010. If the treaties pass, modern-day druids 
may be next in line. See 
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jazz), Western cowboys (rodeos), Native Hawaiians (surfing), 
and Neapolitans (pizza). 55 It may be only a matter of time 
before Norway contacts Marvel comics to reclaim Thor of 
behalf of Scandinavian Norsemen. And Greece will doubtless 
want a piece of the Percy Jackson Olympian book and film 
franchise. 56 
Second, in assuming a one-to-one correspondence 
between culture and communal identities, the WIPO draft 
treaties embrace an understanding of culture based on 
nineteenth century anthropology-one that anthropologists 
themselves have long since rejected. 57 Modem anthropologists 
view culture (including traditional culture) as lacking clear 
boundaries and characterized by hybridity, heterogeneity, and 
contestation. 58 Given the treaties' restrictions on use "beyond 
the traditional context," such imprecision could lend itself to 
arbitrary line-drawing or discriminatory enforcement. 59 
Furthermore, many cultural traditions are derived from 
earlier sources. 60 Are both equally entitled to protection, or 
would late-comers be deemed to infringe their antecedents?61 
Further difficulties arise when traditions cross borders or are 
55 Cf Pager, supra note 1, at 1841 n.29. 
56 The Quileute Indians' claim on the Twilight franchise has already been 
adumbrated. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Meanwhile, Harry 
Potter contains such a broad mix of cultural influences, it could be 
anybody's prize. 
57 See Pager, supra note 1, at 1868-69. 
58 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1, at 4-5,221-22,248-49. 
59 See Pager, supra note 1, at 1870, 1881-85. 
60 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 17, at 1228 (observing that Christianity 
could be viewed as a derivative form of Jewish TCE). 
61 Under this logic, the NFL might be forced to settle up with the English 
Football Association. See also Hughes, supra note 17, at 1238 (citing 
example of multinational origins of West African "highlife" music). 
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shared among more than community. 62 Conflicting claims to 
entitlement are inevitable, especially where contested traditions 
that value as marketable commodities. 63 Unfortunately, as one 
participant in WIPO's TK negotiations has commented, 
"demandeurs have failed to treat this problem seriously."64 
Finally, the specter of state control hovers over the 
entire project of TK rights. The extent to which Member State 
governments will be authorized to act as custodians of 
traditional knowledge and cultural expression on behalf of 
source communities within their territorial boundaries remains 
a contested issue in the WIPO draft treaties. 65 Even without 
gaining direct control over the rights, national authorities will, 
as a practical matter, be responsible for implementing the 
treaties, giving them substantial indirect leverage. Given the 
often-fraught relations between indigenous peoples and 
national governments, and the checkered history of state 
control over natural resources, there is a serious concern that 
indigenous rights will be manipulated by authoritarian regimes 
to harness tradition in service of nationalist agendas. 66 
62 See Pager, supra note 1, at 1877; cf Indonesia and Malaysia: No 
Brotherly Love, THE ECONOMIST, October 13, 2007, at 47. 
63 !d. at 1842, n.31. Recognizing the possibility of such disputes, the 
treaties provide for referral to an undefined "alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism" by mutual agreement yet says nothing about the substantive 
criteria that should govern such disputes. TCE Treaty, art. 8.2; TK Treaty, 
art. 4.5. 
64 Hughes, supra note 17, at 1237; see also Brown, supra note 1 (noting 
that "vexing questions of origins and boundaries ... are commonly swept 
under the rug in public discussions"). 
65 TK Treaty, art. 2.2; TCE Treaty, art. 2.3. 
66 See Hughes, supra note 17, at 1260-65; Pager, supra note 1, at 1883-85. 
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B. The Dangers of Overbreadth 
From the overview provided above, three main 
propositions emerge: ( 1) the scope of such protection 
contemplated by the draft WIPO treaties is comprehensive, far-
reaching, and, at least at the multilateral level, unprecedented; 
(2) the subject matter that the treaties would cover is similarly 
capacious, encompassing vast swathes of materials currently in 
the public domain; and (3) the beneficiaries of such protection 
remain uncertain, making conflicts over the allocation and 
control of traditional knowledge rights all but inevitable. 
Taken on their own, any of these propositions are 
troubling. In combination, they strongly counsel a sober reality 
check before proceeding further. Unleashing a vast new set of 
intangible property rights without geographic or temporal 
limitations could lead to any number of dystopian outcomes. 
Abuses by authoritarian actors could subvert TK rights to 
suppress speech or oppress disfavored minorities. 67 Restricting 
information flows could jeopardize societal interests in public 
health and scientific research. 68 Obstruction of commerce 
could discourage investment and jeopardize development. 69 
Conflicting claims could provoke inter-ethnic discord. 70 
Indeed, the untested nature of the TK regime raises the 
potential for unintended outcomes even assuming good faith 
implementation. 71 Rather than revitalizing indigenous source 
communities, overbroad protection could ultimately hasten 
67 See Pager, supra note 1, at 1881-85. 
68 See Pager, supra note 1, at 1838; Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of 
Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO]. INT'L&COMP. L. 519,531-33 (2003). 
69 See Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 Yale L. J. 
991,999-1000 (2005). 
70 Pager, supra note 1, at 1842, 1877. 
71 See Brown, supra note 1, at 215-18. 
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their demise by preventing the forms of creative repurposing 
and commodification necessary to sustain cultural vitality. 72 
This is not to say that TK rights are doomed to fail. 
With sufficient attention and effort, the pitfalls described could 
conceivably be negotiated and appropriate balances struck. 
Yet, the prospect of such dystopian outcomes suggests that 
WIPO negotiators would do better to adopt a more modest 
approach that aims small and goes slow. Rather than seeking 
to instantiate a truly global system of protection, WIPO 
negotiators should ask whether regional regimes might suffice. 
Rather than rolling together multiple layers of overlapping 
protections in a "belt and suspenders" approach, they should 
consider whether a more narrowly tailored regime could 
achieve the desired goals. More than anything, they should 
clarify the goals of TK protection and assess the extent to 
which particular goals apply in particular contexts. 
Unfortunately, such clarity of purpose has eluded TK 
proponents. Negotiations have proceeded under a delusional 
logic that has avoided any serious cost-benefit accounting. 
Commentators have spent more time proffering "solutions" 
than they have diagnosing the problem. The resultant treaty 
drafting reflects an "all of the above" buffet mentality rather 
than a carefully considered menu of a la carte choices. 73 The 
following part attempts to remedy such shortcomings and to 
unpack the conflicting imperatives that underlie calls for TK 
protection. 
72 !d. at 1840. 
73 See infra Part IV. 
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II. SCRUTINIZING RATIONALES FOR TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION 
108 
A. The Misappropriation Archetype: A Tale of Two 
Injuries 
Scholarship advocating protection of traditional 
knowledge (TK) has grown from a trickle to a flood as the 
traditional knowledge juggernaut has gained steam. Many of 
the scholarly articles on TK follow a predictable trajectory. 
They begin with an anecdote of misappropriation that hews to 
archetypal lines as follows: 
A Western traveler heads deep into the rainforest and 
encounters an indigenous tribe who have lived peaceably in 
this pristine habitat for centuries, guided by the wisdom of 
their ancestors. Insinuating himself into their confidence, the 
predatory interloper observes the tribal members engaged in 
their traditional practices: He takes note as the village shaman 
gathers a particular flower to brew an herbal remedy and 
records the "healing song" that the villagers sing to hasten the 
passage of sickness. The Western interloper then departs, and, 
returning home, proceeds to commercially exploit these facets 
of the tribe's cultural heritage-both the "healing song" and 
the shaman's flower remedy-without the tribe's consent and 
in an inauthentic and culturally insensitive manner, while 
falsely representing the origins of his wares as "1 00% 
indigenous-made." Upon learning of these acts of 
misappropriation, the tribal community is devastated, its 
heritage despoiled and its traditional order upended. 
Meanwhile, the indignity of the violation is compounded by the 
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knowledge that others are profiting at the community's 
expense. 74 
After relating such a tale of injustice, law review 
articles on TK typically bemoan the absence of a remedy under 
current law, while intimating that such misappropriation is 
rampant and proliferating. 75 The articles then proceed to 
advocate their preferred scheme to prevent future abuses. 
Where these articles often fall short, however, is in developing 
a normative framework whereby their proposed remedies can 
be measured against the rationales that ostensibly justify 
them. 76 This failure to closely scrutinize the relationship 
between means and ends is problematic because, in fact, there 
are deep tensions between the normative rationales 
underpinning TK protections that point us in fundamentally 
different directions. 
For example, within the archetypal tale of 
misappropriation presented above, several distinct harms can 
be identified that could justify a remedy. We will focus here 
on four: (1) the unsavory business practices of the predatory 
interloper who "insinuates himself' into the tribe's confidence 
and breaches their trust; (2) misrepresenting the commercial 
products as "100% indigenous-made"; (3) economic injustice 
related to the distribution of commercial gains ("profiting at the 
74 See Jim Chen, There's No Such Thing as Biopiracy . .. And It's a Good 
Thing Too, 37 MCGEORGE L. REv. 1, 4 (2006) (describing the "predictable 
script" that such tales of exploitation follow). Indeed, use of foundational 
anecdotes as a discursive strategy is so prevalent in the TK literature that 
Chen offers his own fill-in-the-blank template. !d. 
75 See, e.g., Riley, supra note 1, at 79; Farley, supra note 1, at 7. 
76 See Hughes, supra note 17, at 1228 (criticizing TK proponents' 
"tendency to simplify and make sweeping, often unsupported claims" and to 
conflate unrelated issues). 
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community's expense"); and (4) cultural injuries that arise 
from exploiting the tribe's heritage in an "inauthentic and 
culturally insensitive manner." 
The first two categories of harm-breach of trust and 
misrepresentation-involve deceptive practices that violate 
existing standards of commercial morality. These represent 
easy cases to deal with both normatively and positively. By 
contrast, the third harm identified above focuses not on the 
circumstances in which the interloper committed the 
misappropriation, but rather on the distribution of the proceeds. 
The claimed injury in allowing others to profit "at the 
community's expense" suggests an anti-free riding principle 
premised on unjust enrichment. Finally, the fourth harm 
focuses on the effects of the inauthentic and culturally 
insensitive use, which renders the heritage "despoiled" and 
leaves the community's "traditional order upended." The 
injuries here are cultural in nature; a cultural integrity rationale 
analogous to moral rights in copyright seems applicable. 77 
These distinct theoretical bases by which the various harms can 
be cognized-commercial morality, economic justice, and 
cultural integrity-implicate very different remedial 
frameworks. The following sections address each in tum. 
B. Unfair Business Practices 
Let us begin by examining the easy cases: the first two 
categories of harm involving breach of trust and 
misrepresentation. The wrongful conduct here concerns either 
77 See Robert K. Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala, Looking Beyond Intellectual 
Property in Resolving Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of 
Indigenous Peoples, ll CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 633,641-45 (2003) 
(exploring potential for moral rights to address cultural integrity concerns). 
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deception or unsavory business practices whose objectionable 
nature seems clear on its face. Commercial morality standards 
represent a bedrock feature of almost every legal system. 
Prohibitions against unfair competition are also enshrined in 
international IP law. 78 Moreover, unfair competition law itself 
supplies a protean wellspring whose application has been 
melded to fit a variety of circumstances. 79 Indeed, as we will 
see, remedying the injuries alleged here would require only 
minor extension of existing law. 
Consider first the circumstances in which our 
hypothetical appropriator initially came into possession of the 
tribe's cultural heritage. While the hypothetical facts do not 
elaborate on the specific means by which the interloper 
"insinuat[ed] himself into the tribe's confidence," acts of 
deception, breaches of promise and violations of trust all 
contravene basic, widely accepted principles of private civil 
law. While the applicable legal analysis will depend on facts 
of the specific breach, a variety of doctrinal frameworks could 
apply: (a) contractual theories such as implied contract or 
promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance; 80 (b) breach of trust 
78 Cf Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. lObis, 
as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights art. 39(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
79 See Edson B. Rodrigues, Using the TRIPS Agreement's Unfair 
Competition Clause to Curb the Misappropriation of Biological Resources, 
4 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 139, 141-42 (2014); Nari Lee et al., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND PUBLICITY 19 (2014). 
80 See Bower v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 852 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir. 
1988); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 cmt. a (1981) (defining 
implied contracts); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981) 
(regarding detrimental reliance and promissory estoppel). 
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or fiduciary obligation; (c) violations of privacy; 81 (d) 
intentional or negligent misrepresentation; 82 (e) 
misappropriation of trade secrets; 83 or-as a catch-all-unfair 
competition law. 84 Any of these legal theories could 
potentially cover the circumstances of our hypothetical 
misappropriation without requiring much in the way of 
doctrinal elaboration. 85 Indeed, precedents already exist for 
applying several such theories in the TK context. 86 Therefore, 
in regulating misappropriation based on such dishonest 
practices, the WIPO treaties rest on a solid, jurisprudential 
footing. 
Admittedly, the WIPO treaties go a step beyond 
prohibiting outright deception. They also prescribe an 
"informed consent" standard that imposes an affirmative duty 
on prospective appropriators to disclose their intentions and 
provide material information for source communities to make a 
fully informed decision. Yet, here too, the duty imposed rests 
on established precedent. Legal systems routinely impose such 
affirmative duties of disclosure in circumstances where stark 
asymmetries of information and power exist, or where the 
consequences of a hasty decision could result in significant and 
81 15 U.S.C. § 687f (2011) (explaining breach of fiduciary duty in 
commerce and trade); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-28.1 (West 1980) 
(illustrating rights to privacy). 
82 225 IlL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 450/30.1 (West 2004) (defining intentional 
and negligent misrepresentation). 
83 See Deepa Varadarajan, A Trade Secret Approach to Protecting 
Traditional Knowledge, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 371, 396-404 (2011). 
84 See generally Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition Law (1995). 
85 See Varadarajan, supra note 83, at 398. 
86 See Foster and Others v. Mountford and Rigby Ltd. (1976) 14 ALR 71 
(breach of trust); Bulun v. R&T Textiles Pty. Ltd. (1998) 41 IPR 513 
(deception). 
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irrevocable harm. 87 Both of these circumstances arguably 
apply in the TK context: Indigenous peoples are unlikely to be 
equipped to negotiate sophisticated licensing transactions, 88 
and information, by its very nature, is often impossible to 
reclaim once released to the public domain. 89 Western 
appropriators are likely to be the party best situated to avert 
such ill-considered disclosures; therefore, it does not seem 
unreasonable to place the burden on them. 
The misrepresentation claim is similarly supported by 
ample precedent. Misrepresenting the origins of commercial 
goods violates widely accepted principles of unfair competition 
law: in addition to punishing sharp practices by the perpetrator, 
we can also invoke consumer protection to justify a remedy. 90 
We could analyze the violation in terms of trademark law, false 
advertising, unfair competition, or consumer fraud. 91 
However, the bottom line remains: acts of commercial 
misrepresentation are wrongful, independently of anything 
specific to the TK context. The WIPO treaties again rest on 
solid ground in prohibiting such deceptive practices. A wealth 
of existing precedent supports prohibitions against 
87 See 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504 (West 2002) (discussing informed 
consent in medical procedures); N.Y. ST RPC RULE 1.7 (McKinney 2009) 
(explaining informed consent in client-lawyer relationship); KY. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 199.011 (West 1984) (defining informed consent in adoption); 
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. IlL. L. REv. 939, 940 (2007) 
(discussing informed consent in abortion cases); Judith T. Younger, 
Antenuptial Agreements, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 697, 718 (2001) (same 
for pre-nuptial agreements). 
88 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1, at 1346-53. 
89 See Varadarajan, supra note 80, at 416 (citing Arrow's paradox). 
90 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition§ 4 cmt. a (1995). 
91 !d.; 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition§ 2:33 (4th ed.). 
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misrepresentation in the TK context, 92 and, as with the initial 
breach of trust cases, only relatively minor doctrinal 
elaborations are required to take this step. 93 Indeed, the US 
and several countries have already taken steps to extend 
trademark -style protection to indigenous communities. 94 
Once again, the most problematic aspect of the WIPO 
treaties may be their inclusion of affirmative attribution 
requirements that extend beyond actual misrepresentation. 95 
Such affirmative obligations are harder to justify under existing 
unfair competition law. 96 Even so, there are plenty of 
92 See, e.g., Millpurrurru, 41 IPR 513, 514; Hapiuk, supra note 10; Matthew 
Rimmer, Australian Icons: Authenticity Marks and Identity Politics, 3 
INDIGENOUS L.J ., 139-179 (2004 ). 
93 While use in commerce is required for TM law to apply, the Indian Craft 
Protection Act has no such requirement. Trademark law also requires 
distinctiveness in territory where enforcement takes place. However, the 
well-known marks doctrine already provides an exception. See Paris 
Convention, § 6bis. And the law on geographical indications goes even 
further. See TRIPS, art. 23; Lisbon Agreement (protection determined by 
source country). Moreover, consumer protection laws against fraud and 
unfair competition could still apply to objectively misleading claims 
regarding authenticity. See Farley, supra note 1, at 52. 
94 See Robert Miller, American Indians and Tribal Intellectual Property, 13 
TULANE J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 179, 180, 183 (2010) (describing 
protections for American Indian tribes through both trademark and sui 
generis legislation); Rimmer, supra note 92, at 157-171 (describing 
analogous initiatives in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada). 
95 The draft treaties require both attribution as a moral right and also source 
disclosure for patents based on TK derivatives. See TK Treaty, Art. 
3.l(b)(i), 4bis; TCE Treaty, Art. 3.l(b)(i). 
96 While some authority has suggested that attribution can be implied as a 
requirement of the Lanham Act, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 25 (2003) 
casts doubt on the viability of such a theory under U.S. law. Accord Guan 
Xiaomeng, Zhang Yimou Sued over Opera Copyright, CHINA DAILY, May 
12, 2010 (upholding non-attribution of Chinese opera). 
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examples of such affirmative disclosure/labeling requirements 
elsewhere in the regulation of commercial speech, 97 and the 
burden of complying hardly seems onerous. 98 
Unfair competition law also provides a natural fit with 
other aspects of TK protections. Both trademark and trade 
secret law can easily accommodate communal or concurrent 
ownership. 99 Originality is not a threshold requirement for 
protection. The scope of eligible subject matter is extremely 
broad. 10° Formalities are minimal. 101 Compared to copyright 
and patent protection, unfair competition law therefore offers a 
97 See United States International Trade Commission, Country-of-Origin 
Marking: Review of Laws, Regulations, and Practices, Inv. No. 332-336, 
USITC PUB. 2975 (July 1996), 
http://www. usitc.gov/publications/332/pub297 5 .pdf (describing country of 
origin labeling requirements); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223 
(1980) (analyzing affirmative duty of insiders to disclose when selling 
stocks); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 (1977) (describing seller's 
duty to disclose latent defects of property); The FEC and the Federal 
Campaign Finance Law, FEDERAL ElECTION COMMISSION, 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml#Disclosure (describing 
disclosure duties under federal campaign finance law). 
98 Attribution requirements are also an integral component of moral rights 
under copyright law. See Berne Convention § 6bis. Some question, 
however, whether a moral rights framework translates to the TK context. 
See, e.g., Farley, supra note l, at 48-49. 
99 Because the rights focus on conduct of the appropriator, standing to 
enforce such rights can be shared among a plurality of affected parties. See 
Farley, supra note l, at 52-53. 
100 Christopher C. Larkin, Qualitex Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1017, 
1023 (2004) (discussing breadth of trademark subject matter); see 
Varadarajan, supra note 83, at 398 (discussing same for trade secrets). 
101 Use in commerce and, in the case of trade secrets, reasonable precautions 
to maintain secrecy are all that is required to establish rights. See 
Varadarajan, supra note 83, at 405-408; Farley, supra note l, at 52. There is 
no fixation requirement as in copyright; no written application as in patent. 
Cf Farley, supra note l, at 27-29; 35 USC§ 111-12. 
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smoother pathway to protecting TK. Moreover, because such 
protections would only apply against commercial actors, 
concerns over free speech are less pressing. 102 
Furthermore, commercial morality rationales also 
readily accommodate the indefinite duration of TK rights 
contemplated under the WIPO draft treaties. Unlike copyright 
and patent, which are restricted to fixed durations, unfair 
competition norms-including protection of both trademarks 
and trade secrets-are already applied indefinitely. 103 
Moreover, the "use it or lose it" basis on which trademark and 
trade secret protection operates closely parallels the term 
provisions for TK/TCE in the draft WIPO treaties. 104 
Not only does allowing for TK protection in such cases 
rest on a solid doctrinal footing, but the impact of instantiating 
commercial morality norms would be relatively limited. 
Because commercial morality claims would focus on the 
specific wrongful conduct of the defendants, the remedy would 
remain limited to the specific perpetrators as well as those 
complicit in their bad acts. In contrast to a full-blown property 
right applicable against the entire world, conferring TK 
protection on this basis would thus only affect a limited set of 
identifiable "bad actors." 105 Accordingly, even commentators 
102 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,749 (1976) (recognizing lower First 
Amendment standard for commercial speech). 
103 See Varadarajan, supra note 83 at 398. 
104 Compare Eric R. Claeys, The Use Requirement at Common Law and 
Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REv. 583, 597 
(2010), with TK Treaty, art. l. 
105 Cf E.I. duPont & Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (rejecting 
notion of property right in trade secrets where claim based on breach of 
confidential relationship between parties). 
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who are generally skeptical of TK rights have recognized the 
legitimacy of offering remedies in such cases. 106 
It is also worth noting that these rationales apply 
equally to misappropriation/misrepresentation of both 
traditional know-how and cultural expression. There is no 
reason to think such violations would be more prevalent in one 
context than another. Indeed, in both cases, the violation 
inheres in morally objectionable conduct by a specific 
perpetrator-the Western appropriator in our hypothetical 
above. As such, a cause of action can be framed based on the 
misconduct of the defendant without regard to the subject 
matter appropriated. Accordingly, protection against such 
unfair practices appropriately forms a common baseline of both 
draft WIPO treaties and should remain as such. 
C. Propertizing Tradition: Moving Beyond Unfair 
Competition 
Having dealt with the easy cases, we must now address 
the more problematic scenarios in which TK is used in the 
absence of any deception, breach of trust, misrepresentation, or 
other violation of commercial morality. As we saw, the WIPO 
draft treaties contain a number of provisions that require the 
source communities' consent for uses of TK even where such 
objectionable practices are not present. These more expansive 
protections therefore operate akin to a property right, 
enforceable against the world. Traditional communities would 
gain broad veto powers over uses of their cultural expression 
and know-how. The WIPO treaties also stipulate an obligation 
that commercial appropriators provide "equitable 
106 See Munzer & Raustiala, supra note l, at 73. 
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compensation" for revenues generated by TK use, essentially 
imposing a liability regime that once again applies even to use 
of TK in good faith by actors who are otherwise innocent of 
any wrong-doing. 107 
The framing of these more expansive TK rights 
parallels the structure of conventional intellectual property 
rights. The WIPO draft treaties even parrot some of the 
specific language used by copyright and patent law in defining 
the scope of protection. 108 Yet, copyright and patent protection 
are premised on encouraging innovation. TK rights not only 
lack threshold requirements of originality/novelty, they focus 
on tradition-something that by definition has existed for 
generations. 109 
Accordingly, we must instead look to alternative 
normative frameworks to justify a remedy. As suggested by 
our hypothetical misappropriation scenario above, the two 
leading candidates are: (1) economic justice and (2) cultural 
integrity. Commentators routinely invoke both rationales to 
justify robust TK protection. 110 As we will see, the theoretical 
underpinning of these rationales is far more contested than 
unfair competition. Skeptics have questioned whether there 
should be a cognizable legal injury under either economic 
107 See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
108 Compare, e.g., TCE Treaty, Art. 3.l(a)(v), with Berne Convention, § 
6bis. 
109 See TK Treaty, Art 1; TCE Treaty, Art. 1. Furthermore, whereas the term 
of patent and copyright protection is constitutionally restricted to "limited 
times," U.S. Canst., Art. I. sect 8, cl. 8, traditional knowledge rights are 
envisioned as lasting indefinitely. See supra note 45 and accompanying 
text. 
110 See, e.g., Tsosie, supra note 1, at 313; Carpenter et al., supra note 1, at 
1110. 
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justice or cultural integrity. 111 However, the present purpose is 
not to engage in that debate. Rather, this section seeks only to 
elucidate the logic of these rationales on their own terms. 
1. Cultural Integrity 
Perhaps the most evocative justification for protecting 
traditional knowledge derives from the cultural harms that 
unregulated use of TK can engender. As one commentator 
summarized: 
The very cultural heritage that gives indigenous 
peoples their identity, now far more than in the 
past, is under real or potential assault from those 
who would gather it up, strip away its honored 
meanings, convert it to a product, and sell 
it. Each time that happens the heritage itself 
dies a little, and with it its people. 112 
Cultural harm rationales draw an explicit connection 
between potential harms to the heritage and harm to the 
underlying community from which it is taken. Advocates of 
protection frame the issue in stark terms of survival. 113 They 
point to the intimate links between culture and indigenous 
111 See Munzer & Raustiala, supra note l, at 71-73, 76-78; Pager, supra 
note l, at 1848. 
112 TOM GREAVES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES, A SOURCEBOOK, ix (Tom Greaves, ed., 1994); see also Riley, 
supra note l, at 78 (describing "cultural devastation" caused by 
"appropriation and distortion of indigenous peoples' intangible property"). 
113/d. at 1059 ("American Indians can only survive as distinct peoples if 
they enjoy legal protection of, and autonomy over, their cultural 
resources"); See generally Carpenter et al, supra note 1. See also Tsosie, 
supra note l, at 310; Riley, supra note l, at 76-77,79. 
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identity. 114 They emphasize the fragility of indigenous 
cultures, which face unrelenting assault from the outside world, 
and the pressures of globalization and digital communications 
that accelerate the threat and amplify the harm. 115 
Misappropriation of TK is presented as the "final blow" in a 
saga of dispossession leading to the demise of indigenous 
cultures. 116 
Blaming TK misappropnatwn for the destruction of 
indigenous culture is not only rhetorically evocative, it has 
serious implications in light of the extensive body of 
international human rights law that upholds the rights of a 
minority people to "enjoy their own culture." 117 At an 
extreme, such harms could be construed as a form of cultural 
genocide. 118 Yet, Western borrowing of indigenous art forms 
does not actually prevent indigenous communities from 
continuing to practice their traditions. Inauthentic uses outside 
the community do not preclude authenticity within it. 119 In 
114 See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 300 (explaining that "Native culture is 
essential to the survival of Indian Nations"); Farley, supra note 1, at 12 
(describing how indigenous identity "depend[s] on the survival of their 
art."). 
115 See, e.g., Riley, supra note 1, at 79 (describing "increasing concern in an 
age of globalization, where property and quasi-property can spread across 
the world in a matter of hours-or, with the proliferation of the Internet, in 
a matter of moments. Accounts of appropriation of indigenous knowledge 
are continually reported, each one more troubling than the next."); Farley, 
supra note 1, at 7-8, (same). 
116 See Farley, supra note 1, at 11-12. 
117 Article 27, ICCPR; see also CESCR, art. 15; UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Gen'l Assem. Res. 1/295, September 13, 
2007, Arts. 8, 11, 31. 
118 See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 310- 11; Brown, supra note 1, at 3. 
119 Thus, analogies to earlier repressive laws that banned use of native 
languages and forced natives to adopt Western dress are misleading. Cf 
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what sense, then, are indigenous cultures-and by extension-
indigenous people harmed by such cultural takings? 
TK proponents respond by identifying a cluster of 
related harm, all of which operate at the level of cultural 
meaning. They "worry that the expropriation of their living 
culture will cause their imagery to lose its original 
significance." 120 They point to the "cultural or psychological 
harm caused by the unauthorized use." 121 They worry that 
inauthentic meanings will displace authentic ones, diluting the 
original meaning or tarnishing its significance and value. 122 
They fear such cultural dislocations will have follow-on effects 
that undermine the community's distinctive identity and "lead 
to a disruption of [the community's] beliefs and a dissolution 
of their culture." 123 To prevent such harms, TK proponents 
argue that indigenous communities need control over their 
cultural property to preserve their identity as distinct 
peoples. 124 
Coombe, supra note 8, at 213 (quoting "Native artists" who draw such false 
analogies between cultural appropriation and cultural suppression). 
120 See Farley, supra note 1, at 15. 
121 See id. at 14; Carpenter et al., supra note 1, at 1109 (drawing analogy to 
hate speech and racial harassment). 
122 See Beebe, supra note 1, at 876 (describing concern that dilutive copying 
will destroy "the work's spiritual power"). 
123 See Farley, supra note 1, at 15; Beebe, supra note 1, at 877 (describing 
fear that appropriation of tradition will "undermine the social and religious 
stability" of indigenous society); Tsosie, supra note 1, at 310 ("failure to 
protect Native cultures ... perpetuates significant harm to Native people as 
distinctive, living cultural groups"). 
124 See Carpenter et al., supra note 1, at 1028 (arguing that "certain lands, 
resources, and expressions are entitled to legal protection as cultural 
property because they are integral to the group identity and cultural survival 
of indigenous peoples."); Tsosie, supra note 1, at 310 (arguing that native 
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2. Economic Justice 
TK proponents sometimes take it as self-evident that 
indigenous people should enjoy exclusive rights to 
commercially exploit "their" TK and reap its economic 
benefits. 125 Western appropriation of traditional knowledge is 
condemned as "straight stealing." 126 Examined more closely, 
however, these claims reduce to an argument for benefit-
sharing under some variant of an anti-free riding principle. To 
prevent unjust enrichment, outsiders making money off 
traditional knowledge are said to incur an obligation to share 
the proceeds with the source communities. 127 
Some commentators bolster this claim for 
compensation by broadening the horizon to invoke an equitable 
accounting based on past colonial injustice. 128 Such appeals 
invoke both distributive and corrective justice concerns based 
people "must control representations of their cultures as a means to ensure 
cultural survival"). 
125 See Tsosie, supra note l, at 314 (arguing that appropriation of 
indigenous culture causes "tangible economic harm ... [that] is obvious: 
the non-Indian business or individual gets a commercial benefit from 
appropriating the Indian group's culture. The Indian people get nothing."); 
Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property 
Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal 
Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 769, 770 (1999) 
(describing folklore commercialization as "short-chang[ing]" traditional 
societies who fail to derive economic benefits from such exploitation). 
126 Riley, supra note l, at 72. 
127 See Carpenter et al., supra note l, at 1103. 
128 See Farley, supra note l, at 11 ("The theft of cultural symbols and art 
must be placed in historical perspective to grasp its implications fully."); 
Tsosie, supra note l, at 311 (connecting appropriation of Native culture "to 
systems of dominance and control that have been used to colonize, subdue 
and destroy Native peoples"). 
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on the historic oppression indigenous peoples have 
experienced 129 and the economic marginalization they continue 
to endure. 130 There is also a prospective element to some 
variants of this rationale: The WIPO draft treaties posit 
economic development as a goal of TK protection. 131 Several 
commentators have explicitly argued that allowing source 
communities to share in the economic value of their TK would 
advance economic justice. 132 On these views, revenues 
flowing to the source community assume a positive value 
above and beyond unjust enrichment concerns. Accordingly, 
benefit-sharing mechanisms could serve to remediate economic 
injustice on more than one level. 
D. Navigating Normative Conflicts 
While both the cultural integrity and economic justice 
rationales could potentially justify remedies beyond the unfair 
competition context, in many respects, these rationales work at 
cross purposes. As the previous discussion has shown, the two 
rationales each seek to remedy very different injuries. The 
129 See Lorie Graham & Stephen McJohn, Indigenous Peoples and 
Intellectual Property, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 313, 325 (2005) Gustifying 
TK rights as a "form of reparations" for past oppression); Stephen Munzer, 
Corrective Justice and Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional 
Knowledge, in NEW FRONTIERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 61-62 (Annabelle Lever, ed., 2012) (same); See Chander & 
Sunder, supra note 1, at 1354-55 (positing distributive justice claim). 
13° Carpenter et al., supra note 1, at 1103 (positing TK rights as "crucial" 
means for indigenous communities to survive economically). 
131 See TCE Treaty, pmbl. (2), (9) ("contribute to ... sustainable economic . 
. . development"); TK Treaty, pmbl. (vii) ("Promote innovation ... in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare"). 
132 Chander & Sunder, supra note 1, at 1355-56; Carpenter et al., supra note 
1, at 1103. 
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cultural integrity rationale aims to prevent harms arising from 
inauthentic uses of TK. By contrast, the economic injustice 
rationale focuses instead on the bottom line; the wrong inheres 
when outsiders profit from commercial exploitation, whether 
authentic or otherwise. 
Moreover, these very different aims give rise to 
diverging imperatives that point us in fundamentally different 
directions. We can anatomize these contrasting implications 
on four levels: (1) the structure of the rights/remedies; (2) the 
nature of the governance regime; (3) geographic scope; and (4) 
normative posture vis-a-vis commodification. 
1. Structure of Rights/Remedies 
To begin with, the cultural integrity and economic 
justice rationales implicate different remedies: Preventing 
cultural injuries requires the ability to restrict inauthentic 
usage; injunctive relief will likely play a central role. 
Accordingly, a cultural integrity rationale pushes strongly 
toward a property rights regime, which would ensure source 
communities retain exclusive control over their traditional 
assets. By contrast, economic injustice concerns can be 
resolved through a monetary transfer without the need for 
injunctive relief. Note that neither remedy will suffice to 
resolve both concerns. Paying compensation does not prevent 
harms arising from culturally inappropriate use. Conversely, 
controls to ensure culturally appropriate use do not necessarily 
resolve the issue of who benefits financially. 133 
133 For example, a cultural integrity regime might not prevent an individual 
community member from licensing traditional subject matter for external 
commodification. Such commodification might take place in a culturally 
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If the cultural integrity rationale pushes strongly toward 
a property rights regime, the implications of the economic 
justice rationale militate toward a liability regime. Remedying 
unjust enrichment implies a right to payment, but not to 
control. Moreover, the goal is to compensate source 
communities for the value of TK inputs in their "raw" form, as 
opposed to the (presumably higher) value of derivatives that 
emerge post-commercialization. Awarding source 
communities a full-blown property right would encourage 
hold-ups and potentially lead to excessive compensation. 134 
In theory, hold-ups could be avoided through ex ante 
licensing. 135 Some might also argue that such negotiated 
licenses offer a fairer compensation mechanism than relying on 
the vagaries of adjudicative processes ex post. 136 However, the 
ex ante value of most forms of TK is probably near zero, 
making the transaction costs for piecemeal licensing arguably 
authentic manner, but could still raise issues regarding benefit-sharing with 
the larger source community. 
134 The primary economic value of TK will typically emerge through the 
commercialization or adaptation of such knowledge. Allowing indigenous 
communities to leverage rights over the raw inputs to control such 
"downstream" uses would allow them to appropriate value that they 
themselves have not created. In effect, such property rights could give rise 
to an inverse image of the very injustice that TK proponents protest: 
allowing indigenous communities to "reap where [they] did not sow." Cf 
Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918). Admittedly, we 
do allow holders of patents and copyrights to exert similar "blocking rights" 
over downstream improvers. However, such rights are justified under a 
utilitarian incentive rationale that should be distinguished from the 
restitutionary interest posited here. 
135 See generally Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: 
Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. 
L. REV. 1293, 1376-77 (1996). 
136 !d. at 1307-08. 
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prohibitive and likely leading to less remunerative outcomes. 137 
Moreover, given the emotional resonance that attends many 
forms of traditional culture, uncertainty as to who controls the 
underlying rights, and distrust of outsiders, the potential for 
hold-ups is liable to remain significant. 138 
Nor does a property regime seem warranted under the 
broader economic justice rationales. Even assuming one could 
evaluate claims of historical injustice and calibrate remedies 
accordingly, 139 it is hard to see how distributional or corrective 
justice claims justify conferring a property interest in intangible 
assets otherwise unrelated to the wrong. Why TK rights? Why 
not land or mineral rights? Such mismatches between remedy 
and injury would be further exacerbated by a misallocation of 
the burdens. In many cases, the costs of a TK property regime 
in restricted autonomy and speech would be borne by actors 
with little connection to original wrongdoers. 140 
137 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1, at 1369-70 (explaining how with 
multiple TK stakeholders bidding against one another, the ex ante value of 
such property rights on average is likely to be negligible, making a regime 
based on "objective" valuation more equitable). 
138 See Heald, supra note 68, at 519, 524-25, 535-37 (explaining why the 
normal market-enhancing function of property rights does not apply in the 
TK context). 
139 Cf Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989 (terming the 
effects of societal discrimination "inherently unmeasurable"). Indigenous 
peoples hold no monopoly on historical injustice, and sorting through 
competing claims would present a vexing challenge that the draft TK 
treaties do not even purport to undertake. 
140 Recognizing this objection, Stephen Munzer bases his corrective justice 
rationale for TK rights on "the wrongdoers or their successors [being] 
identifiable as a group." Munzer, supra note 129, at 61. This stipulation 
would result in much more geographically circumscribed remedies than 
contemplated under the current WIPO draft treaties. 
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Finally, from the standpoint of encouragmg 
development, a property regime could prove 
counterproductive. While in many circumstances property 
rights can be conducive to commercialization, 141 TK is likely 
to prove to be an exception to the rule. 142 The amorphous 
nature and scope of TK rights, as well as their potential for 
contested ownership, are likely to undermine commercial 
certainty, rather than enhance it, imposing obstacles that deter 
investment. 143 Moreover, most commercialization of TK will 
require adaptive innovation to unlock new markets; the 
derivative versions that result will therefore already be subject 
to conventional IP rights that will function as conduits for 
commercial investment. Adding an additional layer of 
upstream rights in the original TK would only complicate 
matters, increasing licensing costs and uncertainty and raising 
the specter of a TK "anti-commons." 144 Therefore, despite the 
symbolic appeal of property rights from the standpoint of 
economic sovereignty, a liability regime would seem the more 
141 Following this logic, TK proponents claim TK rights will promote 
certainty, loan securitization, and induced investment. Munzer & Raustiala, 
supra note l, at 67-68. 
142 See Heald, supra note 68, at 519, 524-25, 535-37; Chander & Sunder, 
supra note l, at 1370. While any form of exclusive rights can be leveraged 
to extract monopoly rents, the risks of unintended harms here seem to 
outweigh prospective benefits. 
143 See Rose supra note 69, at 999-1000; cf TCE Treaty, Pmbl. (8) 
("Recognizing the importance of enhancing certainty"). 
144 Cf Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 
(1998) (describing the anticommons problem created when an excess of 
overlapping property rights blocks development). The concerns over hold-
up costs is especially salient because source communities, by TK 
proponents' own account, are not motivated by exclusively economic 
motives. 
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prudent pathway to fostering economic justice through 
development. 145 
2. Nature of Governance Regime 
The contrasting imperatives of the cultural integrity and 
economic justice rationales are even starker when it comes to 
the governance regime required to administer TK rights. 
Broadly speaking, protecting cultural integrity requires far 
more hands-on management than remedying economic 
injustice. To put it crassly: money is money, whereas cultural 
integrity is complicated-enmeshed with complex 
understandings of authenticity and fundamental rights that defy 
simplistic resolution. 
Indigenous communities differ dramatically from one 
and another in their belief systems and customary practices 
regarding their traditions, making one-size-fits-all approaches 
inappropriate. 146 Many commumtres have established 
protocols to regulate access and use. Indeed, rights to use 
traditional knowledge often vary within the source community. 
Certain practices may be restricted to initiated elders, or to men 
or women only, or even to a hereditary caste. 147 We therefore 
145 Rather than an ala carte "pay-as-you-go" regime, such a system could be 
centrally organized and administered under a variety different models. See 
Heald, supra note 68, at 539-41 (surveying a range of proposals). 
146 Jane Anderson, The Politics of Indigenous Knowledge: Australia's 
Proposed Communal Moral Rights Bill, 27 UNIV. NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 
585, text accompanying n.38 (2004). 
147 Kuruk, supra note 125, at 783-85("Folklore rights are vested in 
particular segments of the community and are exercised under carefully 
circumscribed conditions."'); Kim Christen (describing how Australian 
aboriginal communities distinguish between "men's business" and 
"women's business"). 
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need to pay close attention to who is authorized to practice 
specific traditions under what circumstances and determine the 
parameters of authentic practice that govern such uses. 148 Even 
the procedural and evidentiary rules to resolve such questions 
require sensitivity to customary norms, and, potentially, the 
involvement of source communities themselves. 149 
At the same time, a cultural integrity regime should 
avoid constructing rights along essentialist lines. Traditional 
practices often develop along variant streams, each of which is 
entitled to its own legitimacy. Where similar cultural traits are 
shared by more than one community, inter-group tensions must 
be carefully managed. Moreover, traditions-like all cultural 
practices-evolve organically over time. Allowing for a 
dynamic understanding of tradition prevents cultural 
calcification and enables adaptive mechanisms that keep 
traditions relevant to the present. 150 
Indeed, overprotection here could prove as harmful as 
under-protection. Because the treaties proscribe uses "beyond 
the traditional context," the worry is that they would be applied 
internally, empowering conservative elites to repress minority 
voices within the community. 151 By censoring those who 
subvert established conventions, TK rights could stifle thus the 
148 For many traditional communities, further questions may also arise as to 
who exactly is a member of the community or even what defines the 
community itself. Pager, supra note l, at 1877. 
149 See infra text accompanying notes 240-242. 
150 See Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan 
Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 751,788 (1992). 
151 Pager, supra note 1, at 1881-82. 
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very creativity that is the source of cultural vitality. 152 
Moreover, by preventing adaptations necessary to cater to 
external markets, TK rights could inhibit forms of 
commodification that sustain cultural practitiOners 
financially. 153 The result could be that TK protection harms 
the very culture it aims to protect. 
Furthermore, societal interests in free speech and access 
to information must also be respected and weighed against the 
interests of the source community in preserving its traditions. 
At stake is a clash of fundamental rights: Since cultural 
injuries are said to jeopardize the very survival of the 
community and its traditions, 154 the human right to culture 
must be balanced against the free speech rights of 
individuals. 155 
Regulating cultural integrity thus presents a complex 
set of challenges. A diverging set of interests must be 
reconciled in a fact-intensive process. Given the high stakes 
attending substantive decisions and the potential for 
irreversible injuries, it is worth taking the time to get things 
right. To reach such contextually nuanced decisions requires 
input from multiple stakeholders. Rather than a standard 
property regime where the default entitlements are vested in 
clearly identifiable "owners," rights under a cultural integrity 
regime would remain contingent and subject to blurred 
152 See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Case for Contamination, NY Times 
Magazine, Jan. 1, 2006, at 34 ("Societies without change aren't authentic; 
they're just dead"); Pager, supra note 1, at 1870, 1881-82. 
153 See Pager, supra note 1, at 1870. 
154 See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 308-10; GREAVES, supra note 112, at ix 
(Tom Greaves ed., 1994); Riley, supra note 1, at 81-82; Farley, supra note 
1, at 11-12. 
155 See Carpenter et. al., supra note 1, at 1036. 
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boundaries. Such a stewardship regime would likely also 
incorporate restraints on alienability and, where appropriate, 
regulate proactively. In short, the cultural integrity rationale 
requires a relatively hands-on, resource-intensive form of 
"thick governance." 156 
By contrast, the compensatory mechanisms required 
under an economic justice rationale can operate under a much 
more streamlined process. There are no pressing concerns over 
cultural survival or censorship at issue in that context. Nor is 
there any need to delve into the particulars of the source 
community and its customs and contexts. It is just an argument 
over money, and thus largely a matter of accounting. The main 
issue is determining how much debt the commercialized 
derivatives owe to the original TK input: Does the indigenous 
knowledge form the core of the derivative invention, or was it 
merely the starting point for a more extended journey of 
discovery? Once these questions are resolved, revenues can be 
allocated accordingly. 157 
Furthermore, there is no call to invest in finely-tuned 
adjudications (even assuming the evidentiary basis existed to 
do so). Both source communities and external appropriators 
156 See id. at 1079-80 (describing "governance regime" as requiring finely 
tuned determinations and entailing greater "need for administrative or 
judicial oversight over ... implementation."); cf Henry E. Smith, Exclusion 
Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 453, 454-55 (2002). 
157 This is not to trivialize the difficulties entailed in such accounting. Nor 
should one overlook the difficulties in determining who the beneficiaries 
should be-a challenge that cuts across all TK rights regimes. However, a 
"rough justice" approach that tolerates inaccuracy in the name of efficiency 
is arguably more acceptable where economic justice is concerned than in 
the cultural integrity context. 
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are likely to prefer the certainty of a quick decision and speedy 
payment based on objective, transparent criteria to a drawn-out, 
lengthy process that leads to an unpredictable outcome and 
dissipates resources through transaction costs. Accordingly, a 
certain rough justice can be tolerated in the name of efficiency, 
relying on standardized formulas to bypass more 
contextualized inquiries. 
3. Geographic Scope 
The same factors underlying a divergence in the 
governance mechanisms suited to the cultural integrity and 
economic justice rationale also suggest differences in the 
geographic remit under which such regimes would operate. 
The geographic scope question has multiple facets: First, to 
what extent should the WIPO treaties prescribe a set of uniform 
standards as opposed to allow for local discretion and 
variation? Second, should a centralized authority be 
empowered to apply the standards, or should they be delegated 
to local authorities? Third, to what extent should protection of 
traditional knowledge bind geographically remote actors? As 
we will see, cultural integrity concerns are best managed 
locally on all these scores, while economic justice is a global 
matter. 
On the first two questions, the contrasts are clear: The 
contextually nuanced nature of cultural integrity regulation 
requires ample leeway to tailor standards to local customs. The 
"thick governance" entailed in regulating cultural integrity thus 
pushes strongly toward devolving decisions to the local level. 
Given the heterogeneity in indigenous belief systems, we want 
adjudication to take place close to the source community, with 
ready access to the relevant evidence and with decision-makers 
who are knowledgeable about local customs and contexts. 
Conversely, it is unrealistic to expect a country far removed 
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from the traditional source community to adjudicate between 
rival claims to a particular tradition. 
By contrast, the accounting required to ensure an 
equitable sharing of benefits can rely on standardized market 
criteria without being encumbered with the cultural particulars 
of the case at hand. Moreover, the preference for efficiency 
over equitable fine-tuning in this context militates toward 
centralized administration. Accordingly, an economic justice 
regime could be delegated to a central authority that would 
develop administrative expertise in such matters. 
The contrasts regarding the geographic scope in which 
rights would apply are less manifest. In principle, a fully 
global system might be desirable under both rationales. Yet, 
the costs of globalizing are markedly higher under the cultural 
integrity rationale than the economic justice rationale, and the 
benefits of doing so in the former instance are less apparent. 
To begin with, the need to apply culturally specific 
standards under a cultural integrity rationale makes regulating 
on a transnational scale inherently problematic. Intellectual 
property rights regimes are normally territorial. A 
misappropriation of traditional culture in Berlin would 
normally go before a German forum. Yet, does Germany 
really want to broker a dispute over Australian aboriginal dot 
paintings, delving into conflicting claims from parties and 
anthropological experts regarding authentic techniques and 
customary authority? 158 In theory, transnational forums could 
158 Cf Brad Sherman and Leanne Wiseman, From Terroir to Pangkarra: 
Geographical Indication of Origin and Traditional Knowledge, in 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH (Justin Hughes & Dev Gangjee eds.) 20 (2010) (explaining why 
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delegate such decisions to local fact-finders; yet, conducting 
such long-distance, multijurisdictional litigation would be 
expensive. At the same time, the interests of forum states in 
maintaining adjudicative and prescriptive sovereignty and in 
protecting their own nationals (the presumed defendants in 
such actions) would make them reluctant to blindly defer to the 
edicts of an Australian authority. 
Not only are the costs of regulating cultural integrity on 
a global scale substantial, but the benefits seem uncertain. In 
general, the harmful impact of culturally inauthentic practices 
is likely to be felt most acutely when they take place close to 
home. This point will be elaborated further below, but the 
basic principles are "out of sight, out of mind" and "what you 
don't know about, won't hurt you. 159 
By contrast, the dictates of the economic justice 
rationale are far less geographically circumscribed. Profiting 
from free riding is equally objectionable whether it takes place 
at home or abroad; the same unjust enrichment principle 
applies regardless of location. And given the stream-lined 
governance regime required to administer such disputes, the 
costs of globalizing would be relatively modest. 
In sum, the cultural integrity rationale implicates a 
regime that is thick in governance but narrow in geographic 
scope; the economic justice rationale points to a regime that is 
thin but wide. Forcing a choice between these conflicting 
imperatives requires compromises that would inevitably 
the European Court of Justice would find it impractical to hear testimony in 
a dispute over Australian aboriginal rights due to the unconventional 
evidence required and need for place-specific testimony). 
159 See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text. 
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engender suboptimal outcomes from the standpoint of either 
goal. 
4. Economic Development 
There are also deeper tensions between the two 
rationales with respect to commodification. Traditional 
knowledge proponents trumpet economic development as a 
benefit of TK protection: Source communities are to be 
empowered with the means to monetize their traditional assets, 
thereby restoring a measure of economic equity in the global 
economy. Commercialization can also serve to sustain 
traditional practitioners and thereby encourage them to 
perpetuate their knowledge. 160 Yet, such a commercialization 
agenda fits far more comfortably with the economic justice 
rationale than with the cultural integrity rationale. 
Cultural integrity proponents worry that the inexorable 
pressure of the market will exert a corrupting influence on 
tradition. Practitioners will be tempted to cut corners and 
sacrifice authenticity in order to maximize profits. Even 
worse, national governments may override objections from 
source communities and exploit indigenous traditions for their 
own gain. 161 Moreover, demand from the external market may 
itself dictate a certain amount of adaptation/translation to make 
traditional products marketable. Cultural integrity proponents 
emphasize that economic development must be "sustainable," 
an amorphous phrase that implies restraints on alienability and 
heightened transaction costs. 162 The "thick governance" 
160 Pager, supra note 1, at 1836. Cf TK Treaty, Pmbl. (iii) ("providing 
incentives to custodians to ... safeguard their knowledge systems"). 
161 See Carpenter et al., supra note 1, at 1099-1100. 
162 See Pager, supra note 1, at 1848-49. 
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thereby entailed in turn discourages economic development by 
raising the risk of unpredictable outcomes and costly delays. 
By contrast, an economic justice perspective does not 
oppose commodification per se; it only asks that 
commercialization pay its way through equitable benefit 
sharing. Moreover, if we expand our vision of economic 
justice to include the empowerment of economically 
marginalized communities, then commercialization appears 
positively beneficial. Once adequate benefit-sharing is 
secured, efficiency concerns become salient, and the more 
commodification the better. The result is a constant tension 
between economic development and cultural preservation 
whereby the temptation to adapt and exploit tradition for 
commercial gain runs headlong into objections based on 
cultural integrity. 
5. Taking Stock 
In short, the cultural integrity and economic justice 
rationales dictate conflicting imperatives across a wide gamut 
of issues. Trying to pursue both goals at once sets the stage for 
unavoidable tensions and potentially tragic choices. Will the 
need to accommodate local nuance trump the benefits of a 
streamlined, centralized global regime? Will commercial 
investments be subject to veto from a disparate set of 
stakeholders? Or conversely, will authenticity be sacrificed to 
efficiency? 
No single regime will adequately fulfill these diverging 
normative imperatives. While propertizing tradition makes 
sense from the standpoint of cultural integrity, it likely 
represents an economically suboptimal solution. Moreover, 
even if a property regime did make economic sense, the 
structure of the entitlement would remain subject to similarly 
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diverging demands: From the standpoint of economic 
efficiency, traditional rights should be clearly demarcated, fully 
alienable, and globally enforceable. However, the messy 
balancing required to preserve cultural integrity without stifling 
other countervailing speech and innovation interests militates 
in favor of a less alienable, less clearly demarcated regime-
arrangements that do not scale easily to transnational 
application. 
The approach of the WIPO treaty drafters thus far has 
been to paper over these contradictions and pretend that they 
can have their cake and eat it too. However, as Part III 
explains, there is a better way: differentiating by subject-matter 
will enable more effective tailoring of rights and remedies. 
III. TOWARD SUBJECT MATTER TAILORING 
The appropriate response to TK misappropriation 
arguably depends on what has been taken and how it has been 
used. The misappropriation anecdote provided at the start of 
Part I contemplated two different takings. Let us revisit them 
here in further detail and consider their implications: 
1. The "Healing Song" Remix: Our hypothetical 
Westerner secretly records the tribal villagers in their rainforest 
home singing a traditional "healing song." Returning home, he 
remixes the recording in a non-traditional arrangement, using a 
synthesizer to blend New Age harmonies with catchy Reggae 
rhythms. He also rewrites the lyrics: Instead of a healing song, 
the song becomes a paean to ecological spirituality, with the 
tribe members presented as crude paragons of environmental 
sustainability, living in harmony with nature. The remixed 
song rapidly rises to top the World Music charts as a 
bestselling single. 
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2. The Flower Pharmaceutical: The Westerner observes 
the tribal shaman preparing an herbal remedy by mashing up 
the flower of a particular plant that grows nearby in the 
rainforest. The Westerner surreptitiously takes samples of the 
flower and returns to his laboratory at home. Here, he analyzes 
the flower, isolates the molecular compound responsible for its 
therapeutic properties, and extracts the compound in a purified 
form. After obtaining a patent on this purified derivative of the 
flower, he partners with Pfizer to produce a multimillion dollar 
pharmaceutical drug. 
These two distinct acts of misappropriation present a 
diverging set of issues. To begin with, as noted at the outset of 
this paper, they would be governed under separate treaties 
under the emerging WIPO framework. The "healing song" 
would be considered a form of traditional cultural expression 
and dealt with under the draft TCE/folklore treaty. The 
shaman's use of the flower as an herbal remedy falls under the 
domain of technical know-how covered by the draft treaty on 
TK sensu stricto. 163 
However, the difference between these two cases goes 
beyond the formal criteria that govern which treaty they would 
fall under. As we will see, the mix of normative concerns at 
play in each context differs sharply. Such differences provide 
an opportunity to engage in a form of regulatory arbitrage: We 
can tailor the rights under each treaty regime to respond to the 
concerns most salient in each context. Doing so would 
avoid/mitigate the tragic choices presented above regarding 
conflicting rationales. 
163 The flower itself-as distinct from the shaman's knowledge of its 
curative properties-would fall under the third WIPO treaty on Genetic 
Resources. 
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In general, the musical remix scenario presents far 
greater cultural integrity concerns, whereas economic justice 
issues loom much larger when it comes to the flower 
pharmaceutical. Moreover, the geographic scope in which 
these issues are salient also differs: The flower pharmaceutical 
is much more obviously a global issue requiring a global 
solution than the musical remix. 
A. Prioritizing Rationales by Subject Matter 
1. Cultural Integrity 
As we saw, one of the main justifications for TK rights 
is to allow indigenous communities to protect their traditions 
from contamination through misappropriation. 164 Inauthentic 
uses of traditional culture, such as commercial 
commodification by outsiders, are said to exert a variety of 
harmful effects on the underlying source traditions. 
Commentators invoke notions of distortion, dilution, 
displacement, and disparagement. 165 They worry that cultural 
appropriation will damage or transform cultural practices, 
interfere with the source community's ability to establish its 
own identity, and encourage outsiders to define the group in a 
way that degrades or stereotypes the group. 166 The precise 
mechanism by which such harms take place often remains 
unspecified. However, at their core, cultural harm rationales 
embody a "struggle over cultural meaning." 167 
164 See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 357; Riley, supra note 1, at 132. 
165 See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text. 
166 Tsosie, supra note 1, at 313, 317; Riley, supra note 1, at 78. 
167 Farley, supra note 1, at 10; Riley, supra note 1, at 78. 
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Skeptics have questioned both the feasibility and 
desirability of attempting to regulate cultural meaning in this 
fashion. 168 However, even accepting the premises of a cultural 
harm rationale, we can observe that not all uses of traditional 
knowledge will raise cultural harm concerns to the same 
degree. Because the harms at issue are bound up with effects 
on cultural meaning, it follows that we need only concern 
ourselves with acts of misappropriation to the extent such acts 
could plausibly have an impact on the meaning of the 
underlying source traditions. 
On this view, the potential for cultural injury appears 
much more palpable in the remixed melody scenario than in the 
case of the flower-pharmaceutical pill. Cultural meanings are 
much more likely to be destabilized in the former context 
because the musical remix involves a recognizable derivative 
form of the original source material from which cultural 
contagion could follow, while the pill does not. 
One can imagine various scenarios in which such harms 
might play out. If the inauthentic (remixed) version of the 
melody circulates widely, it could create a distorted impression 
of the source culture and possibly reinforce pernicious 
stereotypes about indigenous people. For example, Outkast' s 
2004 Grammy Awards performance used the Navajo tune, 
"Beauty Way," as the lead-in to their own single "Hey Ya," 
tarring the sacred melody with distasteful and offensive 
associations; the performance featured scantily clad hip-hop 
dancers in Pocahontas garb in a cartoonish portrayal of 
American Indian culture. 169 Native activists have similarly 
168 See Munzer & Raustiala, supra note l, at 71-73, 80; Waldron, supra note 
150, at 762-63; Beebe, supra note l, at 875-80. 
169 Riley, supra note l, at 70-72. 
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decried the demeaning presence of Native-American "mascots" 
in professional and collegiate sports. As such incidents of 
cultural insensitivity are repeated over time, they contribute to 
the cultural subordination of Native communities as "exotic 
others" tarred with the stamp of racial inferiority. 170 
Furthermore, while these inauthentic versions of 
tradition may initially circulate outside the source community, 
their deleterious influence would eventually be felt within the 
community as the pressures of outside technology encroach. 
We can imagine that even the members of our hypothetical 
rainforest tribe may visit nearby market towns to trade and 
encounter recorded music there. Younger members of the tribe 
may acquire iPods or radios and become exposed to the remix 
that way. The more tribal members encounter the remixed 
version of their "Healing Song," the more likely that a cultural 
injury will be felt. The ceremonial value of the song would be 
tarnished by distasteful associations. Its original meanings 
would be adulterated or even supplanted. 
These harmful scenarios are much harder to imagine in 
the context of the flower-pharmaceutical. The original context 
in which the shaman used the flower may have been richly 
imbued with cultural meanings: for example, the time and 
manner by which the flower was harvested, the ritual 
incantations recited as it was mashed into a poultice, the 
ceremony in which the end product was partaken, etc. Yet, all 
of these cultural connotations would be stripped away as 
irrelevant. The only cultural knowledge embodied in the 
170 See id. at 79; Carpenter et al., supra note 1, at 1038, 1101, 1105-10 
(discussing the controversy over the use of Native American mascots in 
sports). 
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pharmaceutical company's end product would be the bare fact 
that flower X is associated with therapeutic properties Y. 171 
Moreover, even the flower itself would have undergone 
a process of abstraction and refinement as its active ingredients 
are isolated, purified, and possibly chemically synthesized or 
manipulated. The end product-a pharmaceutical pill-will 
typically bear no resemblance to any aspect of the source 
tradition from which it was derived. In such circumstances, the 
risk of "contamination" whereby the Western derivative 
undermines the meaning or value of the original practice seems 
remote. Harm from dilution or disparagement simply cannot 
occur without some meaningful association between the 
original source and end product. 172 Such uses will almost 
always involve traditional cultural expression, rather than 
technical knowledge because the process by which TK is used 
as a technological input, invariably involves abstraction and 
refinement that renders the original unrecognizable. 173 
171 Such instrumental knowledge is less likely to raise cultural integrity 
concerns than expressive art-forms that embody esthetic or spiritual values. 
Such concerns parallel the moral right of integrity in copyright law, whereas 
moral rights are considered inapplicable in a patent domain and are even 
disfavored in copyright subject matter such as software where instrumental, 
rather than esthetic considerations dominate. See Munzer & Raustiala, 
supra note l, at 70, 93; ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: 
FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010). 
172 This principle is firmly established in the analogous context of trademark 
dilution. Cf Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 
102 (2d Cir. 2009) Gunior use needs to "call to mind" or evoke the original 
to dilute). 
173 Admittedly, we can imagine contexts where traditional knowledge is 
used in ways that do remain recognizable as a derivative and could thus 
threaten cultural integrity. Such boundary cases are dealt with below. See 
infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text. 
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One could speculate about a potential displacement 
harm if the existence of the purified pill supplants demand for 
the Shaman's traditional cure and thereby undermines the 
latter's authority. However, the threat of this occurring seems 
no greater than that posed by Western medicine generally. 
Indeed, the validity of the Shaman's flower remedy could well 
be substantiated by the proven efficacy of its pharmaceutical 
derivative. Moreover, some may even seek out the Shaman's 
services specifically for an "original, natural" alternative to the 
pill. Either way, the community can continue to partake in its 
ritual flower ceremony, largely unaffected by such outside 
pressures. 174 
Similarly, symbolic objections to the "propertization" 
of indigenous knowledge in the form of patent rights, however 
deeply felt, 175 should not necessarily be cognized as "cultural 
injuries," without more particularized evidence of harm to the 
source community. 176 It is undoubtedly true (and indeed 
174 We should resist premising cultural protection on speculative scenarios 
regarding potential harms. To do otherwise opens the door to "extravagant, 
unprovable claims of cultural damage." Brown, supra note l, at 220. 
175 See, e.g., Ronald Nigh, 43 Maya Medicine in the Biological Gaze: 
Bioprospecting Research as Herbal Fetishism, 43 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 451, 462 (2002) (suggesting that asserting patent rights 
over innovation derived from traditional knowledge does violence to 
indigenous Mayan conceptions of knowledge as an information commons). 
176 Indigenous cultures "have survived five centuries of pestilence, military 
conflict, and dispossession." Their underlying resilience should not be 
underestimated. Brown, supra note l, at 220. Accordingly, the law should 
refrain from turning every conceivable adverse impact into an actionable 
"cultural injury." Cf Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
592 (1994) (holding that disparagement is not legally cognizable as market 
harm in copyright fair use analysis). The effects of purely symbolic injuries 
that remain speculative therefore provide scant cause for the law to 
intervene. Cf Brown, supra note l, at 220 ("One could argue just as 
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inevitable) that "Western" conceptions of intellectual property 
law poorly track traditional understandings within indigenous 
communities regarding knowledge governance. 177 However, 
when indigenous activists object to outsiders "owning" 
indigenous knowledge that "belongs" to a specific community, 
they mischaracterize the nature of the intellectual property 
rights at issue. Patent rights only confer a negative right to 
block use by others of specific innovations that go beyond the 
existing state of the art (in our hypothetical, the pill derived 
from the shaman's herbal cure). By definition, such negative 
rights can have no effect whatsoever on the indigenous 
communities' ability to continue their traditional practices 
because such practice form part of the existing art rather than 
the patentable "improvements" to which the patent claims 
properly attach. 178 Accordingly, the grant of exclusive patent 
rights only affects nontraditional uses of the knowledge by 
outsiders. It is therefore difficult to see in the abstract why 
laws regulating uses external to the source community should 
be deemed to cause cultural injuries within it. Of course, 
everything is "cultural" in an anthropological sense. Yet, to be 
convincingly that petty insults actually promote cultural survival by 
bringing Indians together in solidarity against the dominant culture"). For 
an example of a "more particularized" case where propertization objections 
may have greater force, see infra note 179. 
177 As noted, such understandings are complex and diverse in nature, 
varying widely between and even within indigenous communities and 
defying any facile attempt to catalogue them. See supra notes 146-50 and 
accompanying text. 
178 Admittedly, prior to the America Invents Act (AlA), U.S. patent law 
allowed a loophole that permitted patents covering extant knowledge in 
cases where the prior uses occurred outside U.S. territory in the absence of 
written documentation. The shift to a global standard of novelty ushered by 
the AlA has foreclosed this loophole. The need for further procedural 
safeguards in the form of source disclosure requirements can be debated. 
Cf TK Treaty, art. 4bis. 
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actionable in the traditional knowledge context, the definition 
of "cultural injuries" should arguably remain focused on uses 
that more directly threaten the indigenous source communities' 
cultural identity and traditional practices. 179 
Furthermore, there is a strong policy interest in 
unlocking the therapeutic benefits of ethnobotanical resources 
such as the flower for public health reasons. Given the global 
interest in advancing medical science, we should hesitate 
before subjecting use of the flower to the potential roadblocks 
and delays under the "thick governance" dictated by the 
cultural integrity rationale. 180 By contrast, societal interest in 
179 A different case may be presented where symbolic injuries to an 
indigenous culture's self-conception arise from propertization of physical 
resources that are central to that indigenous community's core identity. See 
Gregory K. Schlais, The Patenting of Sacred Biological Resources, The 
Taro Patent Controversy in Hawaii: A Soft Law Proposal, 29 U. HAW L. 
REV. 581, 597-602 (2007) (describing objections by Native Hawaiians to 
patents on taro, the staple food plant of the Hawaiian people and one deeply 
embedded in the Native Hawaiians' foundational mythology as the "elder 
brother" of mankind). Although the same defense could be offered in such 
cases-namely, that the patent rights only cover novel forms of the resource 
and not the traditional source material (taro, in the Hawaiian case)-the 
"improved" taro would be outwardly indistinguishable from its traditional 
form, unlike the pill versus flower example. Moreover, the symbolic force 
of the objection here is derived not from an objection to propertization in 
the abstract, but rather pertains to propertization of a specific, symbolically 
salient resource. In such extreme cases, an argument could be made for 
denying patent rights under patent law's "moral utility" doctrine in 
jurisdictions where the source community resides in number. A global 
patentability bar, however, seems unwarranted in the same way that 
objections by devout Hindus to the slaughter of cows deserve moral 
credence in India, but less so outside it. 
18° Cf Moore v. Regents of U ni v. of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 124 (1990) 
(declining to grant property rights in human cells because science must not 
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commercializing the melody appears far less pressing. As the 
following section elaborates, such extrinsic policy interests in 
facilitating access to TK/TCE weighs far more heavily with 
respect to technical know-how than cultural expression. 
In sum, because cultural expression is typically 
exploited in a manner in which the original source material 
remains recognizable, while technical knowledge is generally 
not, the possibility of harmful contagion mainly exists in the 
former case (the melody). Moreover, extrinsic policy interests 
militate against propertizing knowledge in the latter case (the 
flower). This suggests that the regulation of authenticity under 
a cultural integrity rationale should be confined to a treaty 
dealing solely with TCE/folklore: i.e., the melody, not the 
flower. 
2. Economic Justice 
By contrast, the opposite outcome obtains under the 
economic justice rationale: The case for benefit-sharing in our 
misappropriation hypothetical is far stronger with respect to the 
flower pharmaceutical than the remixed melody. As we will 
see, in the absence of a legally compelled mechanism for 
compensation, the distribution of benefits from commercial 
exploitation of traditional knowledge will be sharply skewed. 
Moreover, extrinsic public policy interests in encouraging 
bioprospecting reinforce the necessity of benefit-sharing as a 
practical necessity to ensure access to biodiverse habitats. 
These concerns weigh less heavily in the context of cultural 
expression, where the alignment of economic interests is likely 
be impeded); Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 
2007) (same). 
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to be less one-sided and there are no comparable public policy 
interests in ensuring access. 
a. Skewed Distribution of Benefits 
Economic justice rationales begin with the principle 
that indigenous communities deserve to share in the economic 
benefits derived from their traditions. Where others exploit 
indigenous knowledge or cultural expression commercially, an 
obligation to ensure benefit-sharing arises. Again, one can 
contest the normative basis for such a duty. 181 For our 
purposes, however, the key point is that while this unjust 
enrichment principle applies, in theory, to exploitation of both 
traditional culture and knowledge, there is a clear disparity in 
the degree to which such concerns arise; simply put, the need 
to provide an extrinsic compensation mechanism is far more 
compelling with respect to shaman's flower remedy than with 
respect to the remixed melody. 
First, the economic stakes are much greater for 
bioprospecting of patentable knowledge than for cultural 
appropriation. With existing drug development pipe-lines 
running dry, pharmaceutical companies are keenly interested in 
exploiting global bioresources as a source of patentable 
innovation. 182 Anywhere from seventy to eighty percent of all 
drugs are derived from natural sources. 183 Traditional 
knowledge provides a valuable short-cut to locating promising 
181 Munzer & Raustiala, supra note l, at 77-78. 
182 See David J. Newman & Gordon M. Cragg, Natural Products as Sources 
of New Drugs over the 30 Years from 1981 to 2010, NIH PUBLIC ACCESS 
(Mar. 23, 2012), 181 
1d.; Heald, supra note 68, at 531; Chen, supra note 74, at 3. 
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compounds. 184 Major pharmaceutical companies have 
divisions dedicated to developing biologically derived products 
and have invested millions in bioprospecting initiatives that 
seek to systematically explore and harness the latent potential 
of exotic biota. 185 
By contrast, their counterparts in the creative industries 
have not shown a comparable interest in commercially 
exploiting traditional cultural expression. Most knowledge of 
exotic cultures tends to come from field work by 
anthropologists who nowadays are governed by strict ethical 
codes not to exploit their subject's intellectual property. 186 
Indeed, it is notable that the two of the best-known examples of 
cultural appropriations of indigenous music, Enigma's "Return 
to Innocence" and Deep Forest's, "Sweet Lullaby,"" were 
remixes of preexisting recordings released by 
184 MONGABAY.COM (Mar. 20, 2007), http://news.mongabay.com 
/2007/0320-drugs.html; Chen, supra note 63, at 7. By observing the 
shaman's flower remedy, a Western prospector learns two valuable pieces 
of information: (l) the flower likely contains some bio-active property that 
may be therapeutic; and (2) consumption or application of the remedy is 
relatively safe for human. The circumstances in which the shaman applies 
this remedy may offer further clues as to its efficacy. This allows 
researchers to zero-in immediately on the testing the specific properties of 
the flower, as opposed to assaying random flora gathered from the 
rainforest in searching blind akin to the proverbial needle in a haystack. 
Heald, supra note 68, at 533. 
185 See Michele Zebich-Knos, Preserving Biodiversity in Costa Rica: The 
Case of the Merck-INBio Agreement, J. ENVTL & DEV 181-86 (June 1997), 
http://www.bio-nica.info/biblioteca!Zebichl997InBioMerck.pdf; Shaman 
Pharmaceuticals; Matthew Rimmer, Blame It On Rio: Biodiscovery, Native 
Title, And Traditional Knowledge, 7 S. Cross U. L. Rev. 1 (2003). 
186 See CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION III.A.6 (20091998), available at https://shahttp:/ 
/www. aaanet. org/ assets/ documents/research/collections_management/ AAA 
-Ethics -Code-2009profdev I ethics/upload/ethicscode 199 8. pdf. 
VoL 20 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & 
TECHNOLOGY 
No. 01 
2016 Pager, Traditional Knowledge Rights and Wrongs 149 
ethnomusicologists. 187 Despite the success of these singles, 
world music artists have not exactly rushed to the rainforest to 
track down more source materials. And those who do work 
with indigenous musical traditions, such as Ry Cooder or Paul 
Simon, typically collaborate with local artists and share the 
proceeds with them. 188 
The amount of revenues per transaction is also likely to 
be orders of magnitude greater. A blockbuster drug derived 
from the shaman's medicinal flower could yield revenues in 
the hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars. 189 At best, 
the remixed melody might bring revenues in the millions, but 
more likely much less. 190 And there are far fewer instances of 
such high value profiteering involving commodified folklore 
compared to the bioprospected knowledge. A handful of high-
profile examples-Deep Forest, Enigma, the aboriginal carpet 
case-get cited over and over again in the literature. While 
indigenous handicrafts and textiles are appropriated more 
often, such sales typically target low value sectors of the 
187 See Riley, supra note 71, at 176. 
188 See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. 
189 See, e.g., FeiFei Jiang, The Problem with Patents, HARV. INT'L REv., 
(Dec. 18, 2008), 
patents (stating that the drugs extracted from Madagascar's rosy periwinkle 
generated about $200 million in revenue); Gerard Bodeker, Traditional 
Medical Knowledge, Intellectual Property Rights & Benefit Sharing, 11 
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 785, 795-96 (2003) (Hoodia cactus appetite 
suppression drug sold to a pharmaceutical company for $21 million). The 
most valuable pharmaceuticals can earn billions: for example, total sales of 
Lipitor throughout its patent term topped $131 billion. See Jeff Bailey, 
Pfizer's Projected $3B Drug: Name Will Shock You, FORBES (July 9, 2013), 
http://www. forbes. com/ si tes/ycharts/20 13/07/09/pfizers-proj ected-3 b-drug-
name-will-shock -you/. 
190 See Riley, supra note 71, at 176 (stating Enigma's "Return to Innocence" 
sold 5 million copies worldwide). 
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market (e.g., tourist souvenirs). 191 Such small-scale 
transactions often fly below the radar and could be costly to 
track for compensatory purposes. 
Furthermore, the distribution of the proceeds is likely 
far more skewed with respect to the flower pharmaceutical than 
the remixed melody. Patented innovation based on traditional 
knowledge seldom results in benefits flowing back to the 
source commumt1es. Once the Western appropriator gains the 
relevant knowledge, he can commercially exploit it without 
any further need to involve the source community. 
Accordingly, the commercial exploitation of patentable 
traditional knowledge will typically inure to the sole benefit of 
outsiders: 192 Pfizer would make mega-millions from the 
flower, and the shaman and his tribe would get nothing. Such 
stark asymmetry in the distribution of benefits makes concerns 
over economic justice especially glaring. 
By contrast, where outsiders appropriate and exploit 
traditional cultural expression, the source communities have a 
chance to reap significant ancillary benefits through a variety 
191 See Kuruk, supra note 125, at 781. 
192 In some cases, if the active compound cannot be synthesized artificially, 
commercial exploitation will require physically obtaining the relevant bio-
resource (the flower in our hypothetical) in commercial quantities. This 
could provide an opportunity for the source community to share in the 
benefits of commercialization by acting as suppliers. Cf Using Traditional 
Knowledge to Revive the Body and a Community, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2014). However, even here, the 
bio-resource can often be found or cultivated elsewhere, and doing so may 
be cheaper and more reliable than having to access supplies from a remote 
rainforest. Furthermore, the revenues generated from supplying such raw 
inputs likely account for only a small fraction of the value of the end 
product. 
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of avenues. Movies showcasing an exotic cultural tradition can 
stimulate tourist demand to visit the source region, providing a 
source of employment and follow-on spending that might, for 
example, stimulate sales of handicrafts by local artisans. 
Musical recordings incorporating "world music" elements 
often tap the talents of local performers who garner royalties 
from record sales and may go on to successful concert careers 
of their own. The international success of the South African 
group, Ladysmith Black Mambazo, in the wake of Paul 
Simon's Graceland album provides a case in point. Simon was 
accused of unfairly profiting from South Africa's traditional 
Zulu music, but by doing so, he gave the music international 
exposure that opened the door to many other successful 
recording/concert careers by local musicians. 193 Ry Cooder's 
Buena Vista Social Club provided a similar boost to the Cuban 
artists featured therein. 194 
Even inauthentic presentations that show traditional 
culture in a less-than-favorable light can generate valuable 
publicity benefits by putting a region on the map, as Borat did 
for Kazakhstan and Bram Stoker's Dracula did for 
193 See Michael Giltz, Paul Simon's Graceland Turns 25- Part Two: The 
Cultural Impact, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (June 9, 2012, 2:51 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-giltz/paul-simons-graceland-
tur_b_l582897.html. 
194 See Michele Norris, 'Mambo Sinuendo': Ry Cooder Returns to Cuba, 
NPR MUSIC (Jan. 27, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2003/01/27/ 
941610/mambo-sinuendo-ry-cooder-returns-to-cuba. British Celtic folk 
musicians dabbling in world music had a similarly salutary effect on Baka 
(pygmy) musicians in Cameroon. See Who are the Baka Pygmies? And 
what are they doing in Gateshead, BBC ROOTS MUSIC (Sept. 14, 2014), 
http://www. b be .co. uk/tyne/content/ articles/2006/04/07/roots_ baka_feature. s 
html. 
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Transylvania. 195 Similarly, sales of inauthentic versions of 
indigenous designs can spark tourist interest in exploring the 
authentic traditions. Local artisans and performers enjoy an 
inherent advantage in capitalizing on such exposure. By 
representing themselves as "authentic" suppliers of the source 
tradition, they can often extract branding premiums and cater to 
higher end consumers. 196 Indeed, the trademark protection 
against misrepresentation of origins contemplated in Part I 
would augment the value of pursuing such strategies. 
Such implicit compensation mechanisms arguably 
reduce the need for extrinsic intervention. Indeed, imposing 
further obligations might even prove counter-productive. After 
all, a benefit-sharing obligation acts as a de facto tax on the 
exploitation of traditional knowledge, measured both in 
monetary terms and increased transaction costs. By making 
such activities less profitable, it would lead to less marginal 
investment. Where the amounts at stake are high and 
distribution of benefits severely skewed, as with 
pharmaceuticals, the virtues of benefit-sharing far outweigh 
195 See Cultural Learnings of Kazakhstan: If you can't beat Borat, then 
borrow his brand, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2006), 
http://www.economist.com/node/8134147; RADU R. FLORESCU & 
RAYMOND MCNALLY, DRACULA, PRINCE OF MANY FACES: HIS LIFE AND 
HIS TIMES (1990); Shaun Turton, In the Blood, SLATE (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/roads/2014/08/bram_stoke 
r_s_great_grandnephew _ wants_to_attract_ visitors_to _the_remote.html. ). 
Such exposure can then provide an opening for more authentic explorations 
of the source culture just as Bram Stokers' Dracula sparked interest in the 
historical figure by that name. Cf Kim Griggs, Maori Take on Hi-Tech 
Lego Toys, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
(recognizing "a whole generation of kids around the 
world that get to know and understand about things Maori" thanks to 
Lego's featuring of Maori words in its Bionicle game). 
196 See Sunder, supra note 55, at 110-11. 
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such costs. However, in the cultural expression context where 
the amounts at stake are lower and the distribution of benefits 
less skewed, deterring commercialization could do more harm 
than good. Perhaps a few scofflaws would be forced to pay up, 
but the increased costs would diminish the incentive to 
commercialize. If the market already provides indirect sources 
of compensation, the source community could lose more than it 
gains. 197 
Similar disparities can be seen when it comes to the 
ability of indigenous communities to commercialize their 
traditions on their own: Our hypothetical tribe would likely 
find it easier to commodify their "healing song" than they 
would the shaman's flower remedy. An indigenous tribe in the 
Amazon lacks the scientific and technological capabilities to 
transform their ethnobotanical knowledge into a commercially 
valuable form of intellectual property. One needs advanced 
laboratories to isolate active ingredients and optimize their 
therapeutic properties. Procuring patents is an expensive and 
technically demanding process. Further funding and 
organizational capacity is required to shepherd a drug through 
clinical trials to obtain regulatory approval. The tribe cannot 
easily delegate such tasks to others. Again, capacity 
constraints loom as obstacles-indigenous peoples and 
developing countries generally lack access to scientists, 
technologies, patent lawyers, venture capitalists, and drug 
197 Indeed, the more appropriate policy response of countries seeking to 
preserve cultural diversity may be to encourage external investment through 
subsidies. See Sean A Pager, Beyond Culture vs. Commerce: 
Decentralizing Cultural Protection to Promote Diversity Through Trade, 31 
Nw. J. INT'LL. &Bus. 63, 126 (2011). 
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companies. Indeed, the very concept of such mechanisms may 
be unfamiliar. 198 
Analogous obstacles to commercializing cultural 
expression/folklore do exist. 199 However, digital technologies 
have greatly democratized cultural production and lowered the 
barriers to entry. The kinds of production capabilities that used 
to require multi-million-dollar studio equipment can now be 
achieved using inexpensive consumer-class equipment. 200 And 
the internet provides a plethora of ready-made marketing and 
distribution platforms. As a result, home-grown culture 
industries have proliferated across the developing world. 201 
Indigenous peoples increasingly have the means to project their 
voices onto the global stage. 202 Conversely, globalization has 
whetted the appetite of audiences to look beyond mainstream 
popular culture. Demand for traditional cultural expression, 
while still a niche sector, has grown steadily, as consumers 
seek both to explore exotic cultural traditions and rediscover 
198 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1, at 1351-53. 
199 See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 313 (describing unequal access to media that 
impedes Indian tribes from commercializing their stories). 
200 Indeed, even an iPhone can shoot HD-video. 
201 See Ana Santos, Nurturing Creative Industries in the Developing World: 
The Case of Alternative Systems of Music Production and Distribution, 21 
MICH. ST. INT'L.L. REV. 601 (2013); Pager, infra note 305, at 242-44 
(surveying emerging creative industries across the developing world). 
Nigeria's Nollywood film industry entirely digitally based-only two 
decades old and already ranks in the top three film industries world-wide 
based on annual production and global audience); See Pager, supra note 1, 
at 1851-52 (noting that depictions of traditional African culture pervade 
Nollywood movies and account for a significant part of their audience 
appeal). 
202 Sean A. Pager, Digital Content Production in Nigeria and Brazil: A 
Case for Cultural Optimism?, in TRANSNATIONAL CULTURE IN THE 
INTERNET AGE 267-273 (Sean A. Pager & Adam Candeub eds., 2012). 
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their own ancestral heritage. Efforts to meet such demand 
through indigenous "self-commodification" are already bearing 
fruits in many different contexts. 203 
The ability of indigenous communities to "self-exploit" 
their cultural traditions more readily than they can their 
technical know-how is also accentuated by differences in the 
applicable IP regimes. Cultural expression is governed by 
copyright law, which imposes far less exacting barriers to entry 
than the patent regimes that govern technical innovation. Only 
a modicum of originality is required for copyright, and 
protection is immediate upon fixation, without further 
formalities. 204 Indigenous peoples and developing countries 
can therefore protect the commercialized versions of their 
creative traditions under these existing IP regimes without 
recourse to TK rights. Many have taken steps to avail 
themselves of such protections to bolster commercial 
development of their folkloric assets. 205 Indeed, existing IP 
regimes may offer protection against misappropriation even 
without such proactive measures. For example, the Western 
interloper in our hypothetical example has likely infringed the 
tribe's performance rights by making (and later remixing) a 
sound recording of the tribe singing the "healing song." 206 In 
fact, in several of the often-cited cases of foreign folklore 
misappropriation, partial remedies were furnished under 
copyright or neighboring rights regimes. 207 
203 See id. at 274, 297, 328-331, 336-37; Madhavi Sunder, Invention of 
Traditional Knowledge, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 110-11 (2007). 
204 See Pager, supra note 305, at 241-42. 
205 See Sunder, supra note 203, at 110; Pager, supra note 305, at 244-45. 
206 See Rome Convention Article 7, 10. 
207 See Richard F. Roper, Settle Lawsuit Claiming Their Original 
Composition Was Stolen; They Will Now Set Up Foundation, BUSINESS 
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Finally, raising the baseline of TK rights would afford 
indigenous commumt1es additional leverage to extract 
payments. Strengthened protection against unfair competition, 
for example, would facilitate efforts to exploit the marketing 
cachet of indigenous producers, by warding off inauthentic 
competitors who dilute their brand. Moreover, while the "thick 
governance" implicated by a cultural integrity regime may not 
be ideally suited to facilitating commercialization, such rights 
would further strengthen the bargaining position of source 
communities vis-a-vis misappropriators. Based on the 
conclusions of the previous section, such rights are better 
suited to cultural expression than to technical know-how, 
reducing concerns over economic injustice in the context of the 
former. 208 
In sum, the applicability of the economic justice 
rationale depends on the extent to which indigenous 
communities can reap benefits from commercialization on their 
WIRE (June 23, 1999) http:/!web.archive.org/web/20091027110755/ 
http://www.geocities.com/enigmalair/rtiarticle4.html (noting that Enigma 
notably ran afoul of performers' rights with its "Return to Innocence" 
single),bttp://web.archive.org/web/20091027110755/ 
http:/ /www.geocities.com/enigmalair/rtiarticle4.html; Matt Harding, Where 
the Hell is Afunakwa, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=BiHTh6NnoWo (arguing that Deep Forest's hit song, "Sweet 
Lullaby," may have similarly involved a recording of an identifiable singer 
from the Solomon Islands, which would trigger a similar claim); 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BiHTh6NnoWo; Rimmer, supra note 
92, at 144 (stating that Millpurrurru, the aboriginal carpet case, was also 
resolved successively under copyright law, with the judge authorizing a 
collective award of damages to reflect the communal nature of the injury). 
208 The caveat is that the following section suggests that protection based on 
cultural integrity should be circumscribed geographically, confined largely 
to the local or regional context. That said, such localized markets will 
likely furnish the largest source of revenues. See infra part III. B. 
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own. The lack of built-in benefit sharing mechanisms in the 
context of technical knowledge (the flower remedy) makes the 
case for extrinsic compensation far more urgent there than it 
does in the context of cultural expression (the melody). This is 
not to deny that uses of traditional cultural expression would go 
uncompensated in some cases in the absence of an extrinsic 
compensation mechanism. However, the benefits of enacting 
such a mechanism have to be balanced against the not-
inconsiderable costs of implementing such a scheme. This 
cost-benefit equation is far more compelling in the technical 
knowledge context where the asymmetric nature of baseline 
distributions of benefits is so much more stark. 
b. Extrinsic Policy Interests 
The normative case for benefit-sharing in the technical 
TK context is bolstered by extrinsic interests rooted in global 
health and environmental policy. Indeed, a pragmatic case can 
be made for ex post benefit-sharing based on these policy 
interests even for those who reject a priori claim to TK rights. 
As with the economic justice rationale, these global interests 
have asymmetric implications. They weigh heavily in favor of 
compensating for use of technical know-how such as the 
flower-pharmaceutical, but do not apply (or apply with far less 
force) in the context of cultural commodification. 
These policy interests begin with widespread 
recognition of the latent value harbored within nature's 
laboratory. Millions of years of evolution across diverse 
habitats have led to a plethora of exotic flora and fauna whose 
distinctive adaptations often hold valuable, potentially life-
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saving secrets. 209 Big Phanna may be salivating at the 
potential profits to be made. Yet, the benefits of 
bioprospecting are more than commercial: Humanity as a 
whole stands to benefit from unleashing the therapeutic and/or 
other useful properties of these biological resources. Many 
existing Western medicines have been derived from natural 
sources, and many more remain to be discovered. 210 Nor is the 
value of such bio-resources limited to medical applications. 
Other biosciences will advance as well. 211 
The largest concentrations of such unexplored flora and 
fauna are found in biodiverse habitats such as the planet's 
equatorial rainforests, which are also home to many indigenous 
commumt1es. Such communities are more than passive 
bystanders in the bioprospecting enterprise. The traditional 
knowledge they harbor can afford scientific researchers 
valuable leads by pointing to specific bio-resources in the 
surrounding habitat whose useful properties have been 
established over generations of trial and error. 212 Native know-
how as exemplified by the shaman's flower remedy thus holds 
clear potential value to medicinal science. Accordingly, a 
strong public interest exists in facilitating access to it. 
To unleash these benefits invariably requires costly 
research and development by scientists, companies, and 
209 Examples range from adapting spider silk to improve body armor to 
copying ant behavior to program cooperative robots. 
210 Chen, supra note 74, at 7. 
211 See, e.g., Kenneth G. For example, global climate change has made the 
development of biofuels of pressing interest. Kenneth G. Cassman, Climate 
Change, Biofuels, and Global Food Security, IOPSCIENCE (2007), 
1002 (contending that global 
climate change has made the development of biofuels of pressing interest). 
212 See supra 174-78 and accompanying text. 
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investors located outside the source communities. 213 
Pharmaceutical companies may spend up to a billion dollars 
financing the development of a new drug, which they hope to 
recover later through exclusive sales under patent. 214 In the 
shaman's flower hypothetical, Pfizer may ultimately make 
billions from marketing the drug. Yet, the therapeutic 
properties of the new medicine will potentially benefit the 
entire world. 215 
At the same time, source communities and developing 
countries are justifiably unhappy about the prospect of 
pharmaceutical companies reaping blockbuster profits from 
"their" traditional knowledge and bio-resources, while they get 
nothing. 216 And yet, as we have seen, such skewed distribution 
of benefits remains the norm. Once the pharmaceutical 
companies have extracted the requisite knowledge, they are 
under no compulsion to share the proceeds or even to disclose 
the sources from which their innovation was derived. 
Attempts to enact national laws calling for benefit-
sharing have proved unavailing, because such laws cannot be 
enforced extra-territorially. Instead, the only point of control 
that source communities have over bioprospectors is restricting 
access. By restricting physical access both to the natural 
213 See supra text accompanying note 190 (explaining why self-exploitation 
of indigenous know-how is impractical). 
214 Costs include both R & D, clinical trials, marketing, etc. 
215 Or more precisely: anyone within the ambit of allopathic healthcare 
systems-which may or may not include members of the source 
community. 
216 Moreover, as we will see, their claims to sovereignty over bio-resources 
within their territory have been explicitly recognized in the Convention on 
Biodiversity, a widely accepted international treaty that contains an explicit 
benefit-sharing obligation. 
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habitats and traditional communities within their borders, such 
governments seek to compel pharmaceutical companies and 
other bioprospectors to negotiate ex-ante benefit-sharing 
agreements that will govern revenues from any innovation 
arising from the prospecting within the national territory. 217 In 
our rainforest hypothetical, control over access to the flower 
and the shaman is thus used up front to compel an interest in 
the patented drug developed at the back-end. 
The problem is that such bioprospecting laws are a poor 
fit for the problem at hand. Because governments cannot 
easily predict who is engaged in bioprospecting, they have 
every incentive to cast a wide net. Such laws restrict access to 
biodiverse regions and control exports of bio-diverse materials. 
They compel foreign researchers to engage in cumbersome 
disclosures and to enter into contractual pre-commitments.218 
Developing countries increasingly enforce these rules with a 
paranoid mentality, arresting scientists engaged even in purely 
academic studies. 219 However, without the ability to enforce 
217 As valid contracts, such agreements will be generally enforceable 
overseas. See MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. l, 12-13 
(1972). 
218 Scientists are presumptively deemed potential bioprospectors-even if 
they have no commercial intent (hard to establish since opportunistic 
change in behavior is possible). 
219 See Larry Rohter, As Brazil Defends Its Bounty, Rules Ensnare 
Scientists, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2007), http:l/www.nytimes.com/2007 I 
08/28/ science/28 biop .html ?pagewanted=all;http :/ /www. n ytimes. com/2007/ 
08/28/science/28biop.html ?pagewanted=all. See Bryan Walsh, Indonesia's 
Bird Flu Showdown, TIME (May 10, 2007), 
http:/ /content. time.com/time/health/article/0,8599, 1619229 ,OO.html 
(depicting Indonesia's refusal to share sample of bird flu virus despite 
pressing global epidemic). See http://content.time.com/ 
time/health/article/0,8599,1619229,00.html; Malaka Rodrigo, Biopiracy on 
the Rise, THE SUNDAY TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013), 
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benefit-sharing obligations transnationally, such regulators 
have every reason to err on the side of over-enforcement, 
which inflicts considerable collateral damage to scientific 
research. 
In other words, we are presently at an impasse-an 
outcome that is suboptimal for either side due to asymmetrical 
interests and capacities. Perpetuating this game of "prisoner's 
dilemma" could have potentially calamitous consequences. In 
one notorious instance, Indonesian public health officials 
refused to release samples of the Bird Flu virus collected from 
their territory to Western researchers absent an agreement to 
share the proceeds from any commercial vaccines derived from 
the sample. 220 Holding the response to such a global health 
pandemic hostage to such petty dickering hardly seems the 
recipe for optimal policy. Yet, this is far from the only 
example of such hold-ups in an urgent public health context.221 
Meanwhile, biodiverse habitats are being lost to logging and 
industrial agriculture at an alarming rate. 222 
34295.html;http://www.sundaytimes.lk/130224/news/biopiracy-on-the-rise-
34295.html. See Rebecca Mahurin, Adam L. Lunceford & Erich E. 
Veitenheimer, Bioprospecting A Hot Spring of Legal Issues, 9 ABA 
ScrTECH LAW 4, 7 (2012) (noting that India's bioprospecting law imposes 
onerous registration and disclosure requirements). 
220 See Peter Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1563, 1605-06 (2014), AWalsh, supra note 219. 
221 See id.; David P. Fidler, Who Owns MERS? The Intellectual Property 
Controversy Surrounding the Latest Pandemic, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 7, 
20 13), http:/ /www.foreignaffairs .corn/articles/139443/david-p-fidler/who-
owns-mers. 
222 Heald, supra note 68, at 532; Jim M. Chen, Bioprospect Theory, 7 
AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 19, 20-21 (2014). 
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It would be far better to have a binding international 
framework in place to defuse benefit-sharing demands in 
advance, allowing bioprospecting and other exchanges of bio-
resources to proceed unhindered. To defuse mistrust and 
minimize transaction costs, such a regime should function in an 
efficient, transparent manner that prioritizes prompt payments 
and avoids protracted litigation by employing a liability rule 
based on objective criteria. 223 In other words, we would want 
precisely the sort of streamlined, liability regime posited under 
the economic justice rationale in Part I. 
Such a framework would be a wm-wm solution for 
everyone. For pharmaceutical companies, the added costs of 
such benefit-sharing would be well worth avoiding the 
uncertainty and asymmetric responses that characterizes the 
current prospecting environment. Scientific researchers would 
benefit from unrestricted access to biodiverse habitats. Source 
communities would be rewarded for exercising responsible 
stewardship over their environmental and cultural heritage. 
Governments would gain the security of a transnational 
commitment to enforce benefit-sharing. And the whole world 
stands to gain from the innovation thereby unleashed. 
In fact, such an international benefit-sharing framework 
already exists. The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), an 
international treaty contains an explicit obligation to share the 
benefits of commercialized bio-resources and/or traditional 
knowledge with the source communities residing in the regions 
223 Such "material access agreement" typically also provide for a payment 
of a nominal sum up front, but the real money is paid only when revenues 
generated, as a percentage royalty. Cf NIH model agreements that vary 
percentages based on source of knowledge and resources. 
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from which the resources were first taken. 224 Although the 
obligations under the CBD impose a legal duty binding on 
most of the world community, 225 its terms remain imperfectly 
implemented in practice; hence, the demand by source 
communities for additional rights under a TK regime. That 
said, substantial work has been done already to implement 
benefit-sharing under the CBD, upon which a prospective TK 
regime could piggyback. Indeed, the Nagoya Protocol on 
Access and Benefit-Sharing gained sufficient signatories and 
went into effect just this year. 226 Incorporating a benefit-
sharing duty into international IP law would bring these two 
international regimes into harmony, as countless commentators 
have urged and as the WTO's Doha Declaration anticipates. 227 
224 See Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 
1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter CBD]. The Convention recognizes 
that these countries have a sovereign interest in controlling access. It also 
provides that indigenous communities have a right to benefit-sharing for use 
of bio-resources and of associated TK. !d. at 8G). 
225 157 countries have ratified the CBD. List of Parties, CONVENTION ON 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
html#tab=O. U.S. has signed, but not ratified. In practice, US government 
says it acts consistently with the CBD. The National Institute of Health 
requires benefit sharing clause be included within its standard material 
transfer agreements governing federally funded research. 
226 Press Release, United Nations Decade on Biodiversity, Governments 
Fulfill their Commitment: Access and Benefit-Sharing Treaty Receives 
Required Number of Ratifications to Enter into Force (July 14, 2014), 
avai !able at http://www. c bd.int/ doc/press/20 14/pr-20 14-07-14-Nagoya-
227 See Jonathan Curci, The New Challenges to the International 
Patentability of Biotechnology: Legal Relations Between the WTO Treaty 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 2 INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 1, 4 (2005); 
WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, Fourth Session, Doha, Nov. 20, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2. 
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The Convention on Biodiversity also points to an 
additional policy ground for favoring benefit-sharing: 
protecting the environment. By providing a mechanism for 
source communities to share in the value extracted from the 
bio-diverse habitats in which they reside, the Convention 
provides an incentive for such communities to preserve such 
fragile and endangered habitats, stewarding them 
responsibly. 228 Wilderness preservation also figures 
prominently in international efforts to mitigate global climate 
change. 229 These environmental goals thus dovetail with the 
public health imperatives, further underscoring the benefits of 
implementing a benefit-sharing regime. 
By contrast, the pragmatic case for global benefit 
sharing, where traditional cultural expression is commercially 
exploited, seems less persuasive. The policy imperatives 
described above apply only to technical know-how, not cultural 
appropriation. The Convention on Biodiversity covers 
traditional knowledge only in so far as it pertains to the 
utilization of bio-resources. It does not cover TCE/folklore per 
se. Nor is there the same pressing global imperative to resolve 
an impasse over cultural commodification. As noted, there is 
no concerted effort to extract cultural resources comparable to 
228 See Heald, supra note 68, at 533 ("[T]he bioprospecting value of certain 
genetic resources could be large enough to support market-based 
conservation of biodiversity"). 
229 Murray Collins & Naomi Hicks, What's Redd and will it Help Tackle 
Climate Change?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2012), 
deforestation). 
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bioprospecting. 230 Nor have countries implemented equivalent 
regulatory controls at the national level. 231 
More generally, the underlying policy interests in the 
cultural context rank lower among global priorities. World 
music lovers may welcome cross-pollinating albums such as 
Graceland. However, it is hard to argue that the global interest 
in encouraging this kind of cultural innovation stands on a par 
with the development of live-saving medicines and other useful 
technologies. Similarly, global policy-makers have recognized 
the value of preserving cultural diversity, which many 
analogize explicitly to the global interest in conserving 
biodiversity. Yet, such efforts have not assumed nearly the 
same policy priority as their environmental analogues. 232 
Furthermore, given the ability of indigenous communities to 
benefit from commodification either indirectly through 
ancillary revenues or directly through self-commodification, 
the need for an extrinsic benefit-sharing mechanism in the 
cultural domain seems less than compelling. 
A decision to forgo mandatory benefit-sharing for 
cultural commodification would disappoint global activists and 
230 See supra 178-79 and accompanying text. 
231 Indeed, while many countries have asserted legal claims to their national 
folklore, such laws tend to go unenforced. See Susanna Frederick Fischer, 
Dick Whittington and Creativity: From Trade to Folklore, from Folklore to 
Trade, 12 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 5, 30 (2005); see also Sean A Pager, 
Folklore 2.0: Preservation Through Innovation, 2012 Utah L. Rev. 1835, 
1874 (2012). 
232 The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity treaty is largely 
hortatory and contains no analogous legal duty to compensate for cultural 
appropriation. Nor has there been any sustained effort to build on the 
UNESCO Diversity Convention through follow-on agreements akin to the 
Nagoya Protocol. 
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allow some uses of indigenous expression to go entirely 
uncompensated. Yet, the costs of implementing a global 
benefit-sharing regime are not trivial. 233 Given the availability 
of the implicit benefit-sharing mechanisms described above as 
well as the not unusual prospect of voluntary payments by 
appropriators, 234 these costs may not be warranted. The global 
resources and institutional capital required would arguably be 
better invested in capacity-building initiatives that enhance 
indigenous capabilities to commodify their traditions on their 
own terms. 
To summarize the analysis thus far, we can see fairly 
sharp asymmetries in the normative interests implicated by the 
misappropriation of technical knowledge and cultural 
expression, respectively. Misappropriation of technical 
knowledge is unlikely to raise much in the way of cultural 
integrity concerns, because such knowledge will typically be 
extracted from the traditional cultural context and divested of 
cultural meaning. However, economic justice concerns are 
likely to be highly salient in this context, presenting a strong 
case for benefit-sharing. This case is further bolstered by 
extrinsic policy interests in global health and environmental 
sustainability, both of which favor compensating source 
communities for use of their knowledge and bio-resources. 
233 Many of these costs flow from the often fuzzy boundaries associated 
with membership of indigenous communities. The scheme would have to 
define under what circumstances commercial use of indigenous traditions 
would trigger benefit-sharing obligations and to whom the payments should 
be made. The fluid nature of cultural identities and cultural boundaries 
make such determination far from a simple matter. See Brown, supra note 
1, at 111, 225. 
234 See infra note 255. 
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Conversely, when it comes to traditional cultural 
expression, the reciprocal analysis obtains. Concerns over 
cultural integrity dominate in this context. By contrast, 
economic justice concerns are fairly attenuated, given the 
ability of source communities to derive benefits from 
commercialization even in the absence of a formal benefit-
sharing regime. Moreover, the extrinsic policy interests do not 
apply here (or apply with much less force). 
Accordingly, by tailoring protection according to the 
interests most salient in each domain, we can exploit these 
asymmetries to divide and conquer: When it comes to technical 
know-how, we should prioritize economic justice and 
implement a streamlined, ex post benefit-sharing regime to 
compensate source communities for their knowledge. When it 
comes to cultural expression, we should prioritize cultural 
integrity and employ the more intrusive "thick governance" 
required to regulate authentic usage of TCE/folklore. By 
focusing each regime accordingly, we avoid the normative 
conflicts that would otherwise arise from pursuing both cultural 
integrity and economic justice simultaneously. 
Some may object, however, that the above framing 
elides difficult boundary cases. By applying the template of a 
pharmaceutical company, we assumed that the use of technical 
TK occurs in a derivative form, whose final product-a pill-
bears no resemblance to the source materials. As a practical 
matter, pharmaceuticals are by far the biggest value item 
derived from TK, and the focus of bioprospecting concerns. 
Therefore, crafting a rule around this paradigmatic case has 
value in and of itself. Yet, the possibility of boundary cases 
that blur the distinctions between TK and TCE usage cannot be 
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denied. Some forms of technical know-how can be used in 
more or less their original form. 235 Some uses may also 
incorporate expressive elements that have strong cultural 
significance to their source community. 
For example, yoga is a practice with proven therapeutic 
benefits. As such, it could be deemed a form of Indian 
traditional knowledge. At the same time, traditional yoga 
practice is also infused with culturally expressive aspects 
whose integrity could be jeopardized by non-traditional 
adaptations. One solution would be to simply accept that yoga 
is a hybrid that involves both TK and TCE elements and should 
receive protection under both regimes. 236 After all, we allow 
for cumulative layers of protection with respect to conventional 
IP rights. Why should TK/TCE be different? The potential for 
such overlap could be limited through channeling doctrines 
analogous to copyright's ideal-expression dichotomy and 
patent law's printed matter doctrine. 237 Thus, the functional 
methods aspects of yoga would be treated as TK, while the 
culturally expressive aspects would be TCE. A more radical 
step along these lines would be to reject ontological 
distinctions between subject matter entirely and regulate 
instead based on the nature of the end use. For example, for 
cultural integrity regulation to apply, rather than asking 
whether the traditional source was "culturally expressive," we 
could focus on whether the appropriator's end use involves 
235 See Heald, supra note 68, at 532 (discussing turmeric and neem tree 
patents, which claimed traditional remedies in an essentially unaltered 
form). 
236 Indeed, under the definitions of the draft WIPO treaties, yoga arguably 
does qualify as both TK and TCE, as might many traditional martial arts. 
237 Cf Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b); In re 
Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
Vol. 20 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & 
TECHNOLOGY 
No. 01 
2016 Pager, Traditional Knowledge Rights and Wrongs 169 
recognizable elements that have traditional culturally 
expressive significance. Conversely, we could make benefit-
sharing obligations contingent upon uses that result in 
patentable subject-matter or otherwise rely on commercial 
exploitation of facts or methods derived from traditional 
sources. 
B. Differentiating by Geographic Scope 
Thus far, our discussion of subject-matter tailoring has 
focused on substantive rights. However, geographic scope 
presents a further dimension along which TK/TCE regimes 
could be tailored. Recall that the initial analysis in Part I 
concluded that it is easier to pursue benefit-sharing on a global 
scale than it is to regulate cultural integrity. As we will see, 
taking into account the subject matter associated with each of 
these rationales only bolsters the case for pursuing such a 
geographic differential. 
First, the preceding discussion of bioprospecting makes 
plain the necessity of a global solution in this domain. As we 
saw, regulation at the national level could not solve the 
problem and led to clearly suboptimal outcomes. 238 
Pharmaceutical companies are primarily based in the global 
North. Biodiverse habitats and traditional communities are 
concentrated in the global South. 239 Moreover, bioprospecting 
itself is a planet-wide endeavor. Thus, a compensation regime 
for bioprospecting cannot be cabined within any limited set of 
regional actors. To achieve economic justice requires benefit-
sharing on a global scale. 
238 See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text. 
239 See Heald, supra note 68, at 525-35. 
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By contrast, the necessity of policing the integrity of 
traditional cultural expression on a global scale is much more 
dubious. As we saw in Part I, the "thick governance" entailed 
in regulating cultural integrity makes it desirable for decision-
making to take place at the local level and to employ processes 
that accommodate local customs. Traditional communities 
may experience the "harm" of cultural appropriation in very 
different ways. Customary norms as to who is qualified to 
provide and receive evidence and the appropriate manner by 
which such testimony is delivered can also vary dramatically. 
For example, Australian Aboriginals differentiate between 
"men's business" vs. "women's business." Women will not 
testify about women's business if men are within earshot, and 
vice versa. 24° For at least one Aboriginal community, the 
submission of evidence was also contingent upon location: 
testimony regarding the cultural significance of a place could 
only be imparted at the place in question. 241 Similarly, in a 
Canadian First Nations case, property claims could only be 
invoked by singing in open court a traditional performative 
declaration. 242 Devolving decisions to the local level will 
accommodate such indigenous belief systems and enable a 
more nuanced tailoring of rules and remedies by those most 
knowledgeable about local customs. 
To its credit, the WIPO Draft TCE Treaty goes to some 
length to accommodate diversity in traditional customs and 
240 See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Cultural Protocols, OXFAM 
AUSTRALIA 8 (2007), http://www.reconciliation.org.au/raphub/wp-
protocols-oxfam-australia.pdf. 
241 See Sherman & Wiseman, supra note 158, at 19-20. 
242 See Coombe, supra note 8, at 235. 
Vol. 20 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & 
TECHNOLOGY 
No. 01 
2016 Pager, Traditional Knowledge Rights and Wrongs 171 
understandings. 243 The sticking point, however, comes with 
enforcement. The treaty imposes rules binding on all members 
and appears to assume a duty of transnational enforcement. 
This transnational scope requirement sits in tension with the 
preference for sensitivity to local contexts. 
Attempting to regulate local norms regarding 
authenticity on a global scale raises several difficulties. First, 
the evidentiary challenges required to conduct such 
transnational proceedings would make them expensive and 
logistically challenging. Second, some conflicts of law issues 
would have to be navigated. As we saw in Part I, the need to 
accommodate customary norms of the source community 
would make a straightforward application of the lex fori 
principle inappropriate. 244 That said, blind deference based on 
lex originalis seems just as impracticable. Forum courts will 
not lightly relinquish their juridical sovereignty and would 
likely resist a wholesale devolution of decisional authority to 
the source community. Indeed, IP rights have historically been 
constructed within territorial boundaries for precisely this 
reason. 
Furthermore, because cultural expression is at issue, 
constitutional norms related to free speech loom large in this 
process. Forum states are likely to be especially protective of 
the speech liberties of their own nationals and predisposed to 
resist censorial demands emanating from remote traditional 
243 The WIPO treaty frames a general set of values, principles, objectives, 
and standards, but does not unduly trample on sovereignty and efficiency by 
imposing a set of centralized rules. See WIPO Draft TCE, supra note 18. 
244 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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communities. 245 Furthermore, there is no common ground to 
cabin such questions within neutral principles. Countries have 
taken very different approaches in balancing freedom of 
expression against communal injuries in hate speech/group 
libel cases, for example. 246 
Indeed, the very idea of granting property rights over 
traditional cultural expressiOn may be a constitutional 
nonstarter in the United States. US law generally favors 
individual rights over protection of groups, 247 and such 
unconventional forms of intellectual property would be 
unlikely to survive a First Amendment challenge. 248 Nor is 
protection of group dignity likely to cut any more weight. 249 
Accordingly, attempting to regulate authenticity on a 
global scale would pose some weighty challenges and any 
robust effort to instantiate such norms may be flatly precluded 
245 Cf Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 
F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006). 
246 John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REv. 
539, 540-43 (2006). 
247 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
248 Cf Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 883-84 (2012) (quoting Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003)) (declining to apply First Amendment 
scrutiny to copyright restoration so long as the "traditional contours" of 
copyright are maintained). Measured against the standard of conventional 
IP law, the contours of TCE protection are anything but "traditional." See 
supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
249 See Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1234-35 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("desire to protect society or certain members of society 
from the purported offensiveness of particular speech is not a substantial 
interest which justifies its prohibition"). But see San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 540-41 (1987) 
(upholding more limited exclusivity in symbol and word marks under 
trademark law). 
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by constitutional speech protection. Is the need for global 
protection of traditional expression nonetheless so palpable that 
traditional rights advocates should persist in their efforts to 
secure it? Arguably not. As we will see, the frequency with 
which misappropriation of cultural heritage occurs is likely to 
be concentrated close to the source community. Moreover, the 
harms emanating from inauthentic usage will also be far more 
salient when they take place close at hand. Accordingly, given 
the infrequency of long-distance misappropriation and the 
evanescent nature of the harms they pose, the benefits of 
globalizing authenticity enforcement do not seem to justify the 
costs. 
First, consider frequency. Folklore is the source of the 
archetypal myths and foundational concepts from which so 
much of contemporary culture is derived. 250 However, artists 
who engage in such creative recycling typically focus on 
traditions that are familiar to them and their intended 
audiences. It was not by accident that Walt Disney began by 
mining the corpus of European fairy tales and folklore for his 
early cartoons pitched at an audience composed predominantly 
of European immigrants: Snow White, Cinderella, Finocchio, 
Robin Hood, The Sword in the Stone, etc. 
The same applies to other forms of commodification. If 
you wander tourist gift shops around the world, you will notice 
a pattern: each prominently features the folkloric handicrafts 
indigenous to the local area. You will find Zulu spears and 
headwork for sale in Johannesburg, Aboriginal boomerangs 
and bark painting in Sydney, flower leis and carved tikis in 
Honolulu, and Hopi kachinas and Navajo blankets in Phoenix. 
250 See Nancy Morris, The Myth of Unadulterated Culture Meets the Threat 
of Imported Media, 24 MEDIA, CULTURE & Soc'y 278, 282-83 (2002). 
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These wares may exhibit varying degrees of authenticity, but 
the point is they are selling the local culture because that is 
what their customers expect. If you stay at a Waikiki hotel, 
you want to see hula dancers, not Indian pow-wows. In 
Billings or Boise, the reverse applies. 
While TK right proponents demonize the "cannibal 
culture" that drives rapacious Western multinationals to 
commodify global tradition in the manner of cultural 
conquistadors, 251 in fact, foreign interest in exotic traditional 
cultures is sporadic and haphazard. Such transnational 
commodification occupies at best a tiny niche within the 
cultural economy overall. 252 While the very term 
commodification suggests culture is a globally fungible 
commodity akin to oil, traditional culture is mostly of interest 
to communities who have a connection to it. American 
filmmakers showcase Native American culture. Australian 
filmmakers explore Aboriginal traditions. And New Zealand 
filmmakers orient their lens toward Maori culture. Similarly, it 
is no accident that the Washington, D.C., football team and the 
Atlanta and Cleveland baseball franchises were all named for 
251 DEBORAH ROOT, CANNIDAL CULTURE: ART, APPROPRIATION, AND THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF DIFFERENCE 67-73 (1996). 
252 Take Justin Bieber, Lady Gaga, Harry Potter-most global media 
products are squarely rooted in mainstream Western culture. See Hughes, 
supra note 17, at 1228. While world music does constitute a growing niche, 
such products typically entail collaborations with artists from the source 
communities rather than naked "plunder." If TCE rights are to regulate 
such transactions, we need to decide when the source community can enjoin 
its own members from entering into such collaborations-a very different 
matter than simply saying "hands off' to foreigners. 
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the indigenous people native to this land. 253 The pervasive use 
of Native American mascots by American sport teams 
illustrates the basic principle that cultural appropriation begins 
at home. 254 
This is not to deny that misappropriation takes place 
across more distant horizons. Globalization has led to 
increased contact with and interest in foreign cultures. The 
point is merely that the frequency with which cultural takings 
occur remains heavily weighted toward local takings. The 
more frequent and repeated the acts, the more likely that harm 
will result. Moreover, the gravity of harm caused by local 
misappropriations is also likely to be significantly higher than 
that emanating from afar. 
To appreciate why the likelihood and gravity of cultural 
integrity harms are disproportionately weighted toward local 
misappropriation requires attention to the nature of the putative 
harm. Despite the property rhetoric often used to describe 
misappropriation of TCE/folklore, referring to theft, plunder, 
pillage, and so forth, inauthentic use of traditional expression 
does not automatically dispossess the original source 
community. They remain free to practice their traditions in the 
traditional manner. Rather, as we saw, the harmful effects are 
more subtle and primarily operate at the level of meaning. 255 
253 Even the exceptions illustrate the general rule: e.g., the Boston Celtic's 
choice of a Leprechaun pays homage to the strong Irish roots of the 
franchise's hometown. 
254 See Mezey, supra note 13, at 2027-30 (describing unique place that 
American Indians occupy within the historical fabric of American culture). 
Similarly, neighboring communities tend to borrow from each other. See 
Rose, supra note 69, at 999. 
255 See supra 162-64 and accompanying text. 
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We should not expect each and every inauthentic use by 
an outsider to necessarily introduce new meanings, let alone 
meanings that impair the original source. Rather, the more 
frequent, repetitive and prominent the inauthentic uses, the 
greater the risk that cross-contamination and harmful effects 
may follow. Such harmful effects are likely to prove most 
palpable when they occur in close proximity to the source, such 
as where a dominant majority society appropriates and distorts 
the traditions of an indigenous minority. 256 For example, 
Native Hawaiians feel justifiably aggrieved when Waikiki 
promoters present inauthentic and degrading versions of the 
hula to pander to tourists. Such distorted practices act as a 
visible and ongoing affront to the dignity of both Hawaiian 
tradition and the Native population at large. Adopted widely, 
they could eventually contaminate the source traditions. 
By contrast, where such uses occur in contexts 
culturally and geographically remote from the source, the risk 
of harm becomes less plausible. Hula is unlikely to be danced 
in Bali or Bamako, but if it were, adverse effects on Hawaiian 
source traditions would seem unlikely. Native Hawaiians 
would likely remain blissfully unaware of such transgressions, 
however grossly inauthentic they may be. And even if they did 
learn of them, the psychological and cultural impact would 
likely be fleeting. 
To use a real property analogy, rather than an actual 
dispossession of property, the harm inflicted here is akin to the 
disturbances dealt with under nuisance law: Nuisance occurs 
when the original owner's quiet enjoyment of her property is 
256 The harmful impact of the appropriation in such cases is arguably 
aggravated by its larger message of cultural subordination. See Carpenter et 
al., supra note l, at 1109. 
Vol. 20 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & 
TECHNOLOGY 
No. 01 
2016 Pager, Traditional Knowledge Rights and Wrongs 177 
impaired by a competing use in an adjoining property. 
Nuisance is quintessentially a local matter involving disputes 
between neighbors: Just as a noisy block party or polluting 
factory will disturb adjoining properties while leaving 
homeowners across town unperturbed, so too cultural harms 
are arguably a local issue that should arguably be dealt with as 
such. 257 
Moreover, frequency of the harm can greatly reinforce 
its salience. Continued and repeated acts of misappropriation 
exact a cumulative toll and reinforce patterns of subordination 
that set indigenous minorities apart from mainstream society. 
For example, American media constantly reinforces the 
message that Indians are exotic "others," closer to animals than 
"normal" human beings. From the cartoonish images of 
"Indian" mascots at sporting events to the Twilight movies, 
which portray an Indian tribe as a race of werewolves, such 
negative stereotypes place a crushing burden on the psyche of 
Native children. 258 
Such repetitive harms are far less likely to arise in a 
transnational context for the simple reason that patterns of 
transnational misappropriation tend to be haphazard and 
episodic. Kazakhstan had its 15 minutes of fame in the first 
257 In contrast to the cut-and-dry fashion in which trespass operates, 
nuisance law relies on a holistic balancing of equities that resembles the sort 
of contextualized, fact-intensive "thick governance" we have proposed to 
regulate cultural integrity concerns. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and 
Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REv. 965, 970-71 (2004) 
(explaining why such use of resource intensive managerial regimes is 
limited to local disputes). 
258 Carpenter et al., supra note l, at 1109. 
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Borat movie. But next time it will be another culture's turn. 259 
Disney did Aladdin one year; Mulan the next. Such ephemeral 
takings, however offensive, are unlikely to leave lasting harm. 
Accordingly, there are strong reasons to hesitate before 
embracing the difficult and costly challenges entailed in 
regulating authenticity on a global scale. Arguably, the 
concerns raised by the cultural integrity rationale are more 
effectively dealt with at the local level, while misappropriation 
further afield could be largely ignored. Some allowance could 
be made for regional governance or bilateral accords based on 
historic ties between communities (e.g., due to migration). 
Yet, a presumption against global application would apply. 
Limiting the scope of authenticity regulation in this 
fashion would not negate the logic of pursuing the WIPO TCE 
treaty as a multinational agreement. The treaty would establish 
a framework to resolve regional disputes, such as those 
between neighboring countries. The treaty would also serve to 
instantiate human rights standards that protect indigenous 
communities against abuses by national governments. 260 
Furthermore, the protections against unfair competition 
described in Part I would remain applicable on a worldwide 
basis, offering at least some measure of relief against 
transnational misappropriation. Indeed, the symbolic 
recognition and affirmation afforded by requiring baseline 
259 And indeed, in Sacha Baron Cohen's next movie, Bruno, the titular 
character headed off instead to Israel and Nigeria. 
260 The abuse and exploitation of indigenous resources by their own 
governments arguably presents a more pressing danger than that posed by 
multinational corporations. See Pager, supra note l, at 1883-85. The 
WIPO treaties do contain language calling for governments to act in the 
interest of source communities. Yet, such norms remain vague and largely 
toothless. See supra note 243. 
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norms of attribution, informed consent, and honest labeling 
would go a good way toward addressing the grievances of 
many indigenous communities. 
Still, imposing geographic cutoffs on authenticity 
norms would be highly controversial. The specter of cultural 
imperialism continues to haunt global relations, and popular 
sentiment has been stirred by a few, high-profile acts of 
misappropriation of traditional expression committed by 
multinational corporations. 261 The pain caused by such takings 
is real and undeniable. Leaving source communities without 
any recourse in such instances would prove a bitter pill for TK 
proponents to swallow. 
Accordingly, it might prove expedient to extend some 
additional measure of protection beyond purely local/regional 
contexts. Such global standards could be framed in terms of 
soft law duties to consult262 with, provide compensation to, and 
otherwise take into account source community interests. 
WIPO could then work with the relevant stakeholders to 
develop a set of "best practices" that could be applied 
proactively. Good faith compliance would be monitored and 
certified by various non-governmental organizations, with 
annual reporting to reward good behavior and shame persistent 
261 Lego's use of Maori words and stories to market a new line of building 
blocks offers one example. Kim Griggs, Maori Take on Hi-Tech Lego Toys, 
BBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2001), 
Disney's more recent films such Mulan and Aladdin 
offer another. See supra note 5. 
262 Consultation requirements can be given teeth. See, e.g., Kichwa 
Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
No. 245 (June 27, 2012). 
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offenders. 263 Member states could reinforce these guidelines 
by providing incentives and/or sanctions in particular cases as 
warranted. While short of an outright veto, such measures 
would ensure that indigenous source communities have a 
mechanism to voice concerns raised by appropriation of their 
cultural traditions. 
In fact, public shaming in the form of adverse publicity 
already provides a powerful check against most such instances 
of corporate plunder. Many high-profile misappropriation 
cases have resulted in voluntary settlements even in the 
absence of legal compulsion. 264 Few corporations want be 
seen as oppressing indigenous minorities, and benefit-sharing 
is already widely practiced on a voluntary basis. 265 Therefore, 
263 Media organizations, indigenous advocates, and governments should all 
have a voice in this process. Australia already has some good working 
models that could be drawn upon. 
264 For example, Lego apologized and agreed to work with Maoris to draw 
up a code of conduct to govern its use of folklore in the future. Andrew 
Osborn, Maoris Win Lego Battle, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2001), 
http://www. theguardian.com/world/200 1/oct/31/andrewosborn. The 
Chairman of Stroh Beer similarly apologized for misuse of revered Indian 
leader Crazy Horse's name on alcoholic beverages. See Elizabeth Stawicki, 
Crazy Horse Dispute Settled, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, (Apr. 26, 2001). 
While the maker of Crazy Horse malt liquor initially held out, it too 
eventually settled in 2012. !d. 
265 See, e.g. www.deepforest.co (noting that the world music band, Deep 
Forest, voluntarily pay a portion of sales from all of its cultural remix 
albums to benefit the source communities whose music it spotlights); 
Giving Back, Baka Beyond (Dec. 21, 2015), available at 
http://bakabeyond.net/giving-back/ (describing philanthropic projects 
undertaken by British Celtic band, "Baka Beyond," on behalf of Baka 
people); About Putumayo World Music, Putumayo World Music (Dec. 21, 
2015), available at https://www.putumayo.com/history/ (describing over $1 
million in donations made by American world music record label to benefit 
source communities). 
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adopting even a modest set of legal norms along these lines 
would amplify such shaming effects and achieve the desired 
outcome in most cases. 
IV. ADDRESSING OBSTACLES TO DIFFERENTIATION 
In sum, a compelling case can be made for sharper 
differentiation by subject matter. Cultural expression and 
technical know-how would receive asymmetric protection 
designed to tailor TK/TCE rights narrowly according to the 
normative interests most salient in each respective context. 
Following the logic of this bifurcated approach would lead to a 
more modest package of rights than the current draft WIPO 
treaties contemplate. Source communities would receive a 
robust right of control over inauthentic use of TCE/folklore; 
however, such rights would primarily be restricted to 
local/regional contexts to allow for contextually nuanced 
judgments. Technical TK, for its part, would be subject to 
rights of compensation, but not control; such a regime would 
operate on a global scale in a streamlined, centralized fashion. 
Compared against the robust package of rights 
contemplated in the current WIPO draft treaties, the more 
modest scope of such an asymmetrical rights regime would 
naturally come as a disappointment to many TK demandeurs. 
Yet, half a loaf is sometimes better than none. The preceding 
analysis provides extensive reasons why the "half a loaf' that 
would emerge under the approach advocated here would focus 
on the most pressing issues of concern to TK demandeurs in 
the contexts where the case for protection is most salient. Such 
an asymmetrically tailored regime would, by definition, not 
deliver everything that such demandeurs want, but it would 
supply enough protection to meet their most urgent needs. 
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However, a skeptic might reasonably ask: If the case for 
sharply differentiating rights according to subject matter were 
so compelling, why have the delegates to the WIPO treaty 
effectively chosen a contrary course? To answer this question 
requires an understanding of WIPO negotiations, as well as the 
broader discourse of TK protection within which such 
negotiations are embedded. A full exploration of such public 
choice dynamics is beyond the present scope. However, this 
part of the Article will highlight some key factors that explain 
the bias toward undifferentiated, over-inclusive rights and will 
attempt to dispel misconceptions that may lie at their root. 
A. Built-in Expansionist Biases 
To begin, it is important to note the diverse array of 
protagonists engaged in these negotiations, each of whom has 
its own agenda. Indigenous peoples champion traditional 
knowledge protection as a means to restore cultural 
sovereignty. 266 Developing countries hope to "rebalance" the 
global IP regime, to extract their due share of respect and 
monopoly rents; others may seek bargaining chips to be 
"cashed" in negotiations elsewhere. 267 Developed countries 
have endorsed TK protection for reasons of their own: Most 
view TK negotiations primarily as a means to encourage 
developing countries to "buy into" global IP norms; they are 
willing to indulge in hortatory provisions but are reluctant to go 
much further. Some developed country blocs, however, see 
TK rights as a basis to steer such norms in profitable directions. 
The European Union emphasizes the affinity between TK 
266 See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 301; Riley, supra note 1, at 74. 
267 See Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 
33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 233, 239, 273 (2001). 
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protection and geographical indications, seeking to build a 
coalition in favor of strengthening the latter. 268 Corporate 
interests may also welcome the precedent for indefinite 
protection set by TK rights. 269 Meanwhile, non-governmental 
organizations operate under agendas of their own. 
An alliance between these multiple actors with 
convergent, but only partly overlapping interests has made the 
WIPO treaty drafting process an inherently unwieldy exercise 
that privileges fuzzy compromise over precision. The need for 
consensus may eventually force a winnowing down of 
provisions, but thus far it has had the opposite effect: WIPO's 
modus operandi has favored all-inclusive drafting, allowing 
each faction to insert its preferred language as a starting point, 
while bracketing most of it for future discussion. By deferring 
hard choices, negotiators have maintained the pretense that 
they just need to devise the right formula of fudge and all shall 
have prizes. 
For more than a decade, this modus operandi preserved 
the illusion of progress. However, by 2014, developing 
country negotiators began to lose patience. Insisting that 
treaties were all but ready for signature, such delegates called 
for a diplomatic conference to surmount the final negotiating 
hurdles. Developed countries demurred, emphasizing the 
pervasive bracketing of key terms and provisions that spoke to 
enduring disagreements. 27° Faced with this impasse at the end 
268 Sherman & Wiseman, supra note 158, at 7. 
269 See Owen Dean, Happy Birthday To You, Copyrighted, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY WATCH, (July 4, 2013, 4:15 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/20 13/07/04/happy-birthday-to-you-copyrighted; Waldron, supra 
note 150, at 788. 
270 Saez, supra note 18. 
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of 2014, the WIPO-IGC process stalled, and, with delegates 
unable to agree on a path forward, the WIPO General 
Assembly failed to renew the IGC mandate, bringing 
negotiations to an abrupt halt. Rather than accepting half a 
loaf, TK demandeurs, for the first time, had to face the 
prospect of ending up with none at all. 271 
In the end, the IGC mandate was renewed a year later 
with negotiations set to resume in 2016. 272 Yet, this standstill 
points to the dangers of pursuing an overly-ambitious TK 
agenda: the result could be that the treaties are issued as non-
binding soft law, or even that they fail to issue at all. In an 
ideal world, such a near-death experience would concentrate 
minds and encourage compromise, allowing negotiations to 
proceed under the more modest, pragmatic approach advocated 
here. Unfortunately, other dynamics of the WIPO negotiators 
continue to conspire against this end. First, delegates continue 
to negotiate in political blocs, which encourage grandstanding, 
ideological inflexibility, and the pursuit of maximalist 
positions. 
Second, because culture and tradition are both emotive 
concepts, defending the national heritage against predatory 
foreigners offers a ready-made platform for appeals to 
nationalist sentiment. Just as populist rulers seize "strategic 
industries" owned by foreigners to thumb their noses at neo-
liberalism, so too the TK agenda contains an element of gesture 
271 Catherine Saez, WIPO Assembly Extends Talks On Traditional 
Knowledge, Design; Sets Policy For New Offices,IP Watch, http://www.ip-
watch.org/20 15/1 0/15/wipo-assembly -extends-talks-on-traditional-
knowledge-design-sets-policy-for-new-offices/. Catherine Saez, 
http://www .ip-watch.org/20 15/1 0/15/wipo-assembly -extends-talks-on-
272 !d. 
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politics-the intangible equivalent of nationalizing an oil 
company. 273 The links between traditional heritage and 
political legitimacy also make governments reluctant to cede 
authority over such sensitive domains. Conversely, the dangers 
of over-protection are less apparent or easily understood. 
Indeed, authoritarian governments may welcome broad TK 
rights as propaganda instruments that can be manipulated to 
entrench their regimes. 274 
Third, TK discourse is situated against a backdrop of 
unequal North-South relations. The lion's share of the world's 
most valuable innovation is generated by the developed 
countries, and IP rights have long been viewed as protecting 
Northern interests at the expense of the developing world. 
Southern insecurities over the global developmental and 
innovation divide has arguably led some to valorize traditional 
knowledge as a realm in which developing countries are 
perceived as having an advantage. 275 This quest for 
reassurance and respect can be viewed plaintively in the 
preambles of the draft treaties, which celebrate the "intrinsic 
value" that traditional knowledge and cultural heritage embody 
as frameworks of innovation and creativity, worthy of respect 
"equal [to] other knowledge systems." 276 
Besides providing a salve for bruised Southern egos, 
such lofty proclamations of universal value betray a 
programmatic subtext: establishing a normative equivalency 
273 Dutfield, supra note 267, at 239, 273. 
274 Pager, supra note l, at 1883-84. 
275 !d. at 1849-50. 
276 TK Treaty, Pmbl. (i), (ii); TCE Treaty, Pmbl. l, 4. The preambles also 
trumpet the manifold contributions that indigenous knowledge systems 
make to global diversity and conservation, which "benefit . . . all 
humanity." TK Treaty, Pmbl. (ii)-(iii); TCE Treaty, Pmbl. 3, 7. 
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between traditional knowledge and conventional forms of 
intellectual property. Protection for conventional IP is 
enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement's global minimum 
standards. If we accept that traditional knowledge embodies an 
alternative innovation framework of equivalent value, then 
surely such "knowledge systems" deserve equivalent 
protection. 277 Behind this syllogism lies the widely held belief 
that the global IP regime needs to be "rebalanced" to better 
serve the needs of developing countries 278 : IP rights should 
protect the knowledge produced by poor countries as much as 
that produced by rich countries. Framed thusly, the TK agenda 
affords a deeply satisfying rejoinder to rich country hectoring 
over information piracy: neatly reversing the party positions, it 
allows multinational corporations to be tarred as predatory 
corsairs guilty of misappropriating TK and "biopiracy." 279 
Taken together, these three dynamics work to reinforce 
a tendency toward exaggerated demands and overbroad rights. 
Moreover, these built-in expansionist biases are also propelled 
by an overarching narrative that further distorts TK discourse: 
imperialism. 280 The following section explores the ways in 
which anti-imperialist discourse complicates TK negotiations. 
As we will see, the trope of imperialism both raises the 
emotional stakes surrounding traditional knowledge 
negotiations and exacerbates its intractability by perpetuating a 
series of misconceptions and flawed analogies. 
277 See Hughes, supra note 17, at 1234. 
278 Pager, supra note 1, at 1849-50. This "Development Agenda" has been 
formally enshrined as one of WIPO's core policy objectives. While much 
of the Agenda seeks to pare back existing IP rights and allow greater 
flexibility to developing countries, TK represents a notable exception, an 
area in which developing countries are pushing for stronger IP protection. 
279 Chander & Sunder, supra note 1, at 1367. 
280 See Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 1, at 51. 
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B. Anti-Imperialist Disclosure 
Half a century after the collapse of the European 
empire, the specter of imperialism still haunts international 
intellectual property law. 281 Developed countries stand 
accused of operating a legal protection racket that robs poor 
countries to make rich ones richer. 282 The global intellectual 
property regime is denounced as an unconscionable bargain 
that legitimizes the plunder of information resources and 
perpetuates systems of neo-colonial dependency. 283 
The discourse of imperialism supplies a master 
narrative to rail against the global IP regime. Debates over 
global intellectual property protection come loaded with 
hyperbolic invective condemning cultural imperialism, neo-
colonialism, information feudalism, biopiracy, "strip mining," 
"cannibalism," pillage, plunder, genocide, and much else. 284 
Resistance to such perceived exploitation increasingly defines 
281 See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement: Outdated, Imperialistic, 
and Overprotective, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 613,614-17 (1996); Anthony 
R. Noss, Note: In Defense of TRIPS: It Only Seems Imperialistic, 1 
CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 154, 156 (2010). 
282 See Chander & Sunder, supra note l, at 764. 
283 See Peter Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 369, 373 (2006); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss; Riley, supra note l, at 
78-79; Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright 
Convention Must Be Repealed, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 763, 768 (2003); 
Statement of the Bellagio Conference, March 11, 1993 (quoted in JAMES 
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, at 193 (1996)). 
284 See, e.g., V ANDANA SHIV A, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND 
KNOWLEDGE 2-5 (1999); PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO Owns THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? l-3 
(2002); Farley, supra note l, at 8; BROWN, supra note l, at 3-4 
("vampires"). 
Vol. 20 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & 
TECHNOLOGY 
No. 01 
2016 Pager, Traditional Knowledge Rights and Wrongs 188 
the developing world's agenda for intellectual property rights. 
And a central thrust of this counter-hegemonic agenda has 
focused on securing intellectual property protection for 
traditional knowledge. 285 
Imperialism is a bad word that stands for many bad 
things. And doubtless the colonial powers of the world have 
much to answer for. However, in the context of the TK debate, 
imperialism serves more as a catch-all indictment than precise 
diagnosis. The traditional knowledge juggernaut is fueled by 
multiple strands of anti-imperialist discontent, each of which 
contains its own mix of hyperbole and legitimate complaints. 
Unifying these separate strands of grievance within a single 
narrative may provide an effective strategy for political 
mobilization and coalition-building; yet, it also encourages 
polemic to triumph over practical problem-solving. In so 
doing, it has sustained a series of misconceptions and flawed 
analogies that distort the TK debate and exacerbate its 
intractability. 
First, in condemning misappropnatwn of traditional 
knowledge, TK proponents have a tendency to draw misplaced 
analogies between tangible and intangible property. Such 
analogies are sometimes explicit: comparing TK 
misappropriation to colonial conquests of land and other 
seizures of tangible property. 286 By invoking this legacy of 
285 See Hughes, supra note 17, at 1234. 
286 See, e.g., Farley, supra note 1, at 11-12 (quoting Suzan Harjo, former 
head of the National Congress of American Indians, "(t)hey have stolen our 
land, water, our dead relatives, the stuff we are buried with, our culture, 
even our shoes. There's little left that's tangible. Now they're taking what's 
intangible."). 
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InJustice, advocates imply that opposing TK protection IS 
tantamount to condoning imperialist aggression. 287 
Moreover, widespread use of rhetoric to describe 
tangible property takings-theft, stealing, pillage, plunder, 
piracy, strip-mining, etc.-falsely obscures the non-rival nature 
of intangible assets. 288 Appropriation of TK by outsiders does 
not physically dispossess source communities of their heritage; 
they can continue to engage in their traditional practices 
unhindered. Rather, as we have seen, the harm caused by such 
takings is indirect, subtler in nature and contextually 
contingent. 289 
Second, as we saw, TK proponents have a habit of 
drawing explicit analogies between protection of traditional 
knowledge/cultural expression and conventional IP rights. In 
doing so, proponents seek to highlight the supposed injustice in 
the self-serving manner in which IP rights have been 
constructed to privilege Western creativity while leaving 
traditional innovation unprotected. 290 Such critiques hold that 
287 See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 311 (arguing that the appropriation of Native 
culture "continue[s] the same systems of dominance and control that have 
been used to colonize, subdue and destroy Native peoples"); Farley, supra 
note 31, at 11 ("theft of their folklore represents the final blow to their 
civilization from 'invaders.' It is simply an extension of the plunder 
mentality."); See Riley, supra note 112, at 78 (same). 
288 Admittedly, TK proponents are not alone in invoking such rhetoric. 
Advocates for conventional IP rights routinely indulge in the same 
misleading use of language. 
289 See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. 
290 See Coombe, supra note 8, at 285 (describing existing IP doctrine as 
reflecting "particular interested fictions emergent from a history of 
colonialism that has disempowered most of the peoples on this planet."); 
Riley, supra note 7, at 178 (criticizing "flagrant dismissal of non-Western 
viewpoints in . . . interpretation of copyright law"); Statement of the 
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essentially the same stuff is arbitrarily subject to disparate 
treatment. 291 As James Boyle puts it: 
The basic assumptions of the [international IP] 
regime mean that certain kinds of 
contributions to culture and scientific progress 
are validated, authorized, and thus rewarded, 
while others are made invisible. The 
author[/inventor] concept ... is a gate that 
tends disproportionately to favor the 
developed countries ... Curare, batik, myths, 
and the dance 'lambada' flow out of 
developing countries, unprotected by 
intellectual property rights, while Prozac, 
Levis, Grisham, and the movie Lambada! 
flow in-protected by a suite of intellectual 
property laws, which in tum are backed by the 
threat of trade sanctions. 292 
Moreover, such unequal outcomes are seen as far from 
accidental. The rigged rulebook that is the global IP regime 
can be attributed to a foundational act of legal imperialism: the 
coercive and deceptive tactics by which developed countries 
imposed the TRIPS Agreement as a fait-accompli upon the rest 
of the world. 293 Under TRIPS, rich country IP is firmly 
Bellagio Conference, March 11, 1993 (criticizing IP "paradigm that is 
selectively blind to the scientific and artistic contributions of many of the 
world's cultures and constructed in fora where those who will be most 
directly affected have no representation") (quoted in BOYLE, supra note 
283, at 193). 
291 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1, at 1350-53. 
292 See BOYLE, supra note 10, at 125; Bellagio Declaration, supra note 278, 
at 193. 
293 See Peter Yu, supra note 220, at 379-86. 
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protected, while TK in the developing world is left open for 
plunder. Intellectual property law, on this view, appears the 
modem equivalent of the legal fictions by which European law 
treated indigenous territory as terra nullius, while recognizing 
property claims of "civilized" explorers. 294 
Such accusations of unequal treatment and self-serving 
biases are not entirely without foundation. 295 Yet, even 
accepting this premise, it is a much bigger stretch to suggest-
as TK proponents are wont to do-that works subject to 
conventional IP rights are essentially no different than the 
subject matter embraced by traditional knowledge and 
therefore that legal distinctions between them represent an 
arbitrary construct conjured out of imperialist hubris. 
Such facile comparisons can be misleading. On its 
face, a traditional folklore melody may not seem much 
different than a top 20 hit single. Yet, rather than comparing 
an indigenous melody to a current hit, the more relevant 
comparison would be to an Elizabethan madrigal or Baroque 
cantata, both of which are entirely unprotected and open to 
appropriation under conventional IP regimes. The same 
applies to the rest of Western "traditional know ledge"-a 
veritable trove of cultural and scientific knowledge that 
includes every innovation made up through the twentieth 
century (early 20th century for copyrighted materials, late 20th 
century for patented subject-matter). 296 This vast body of 
294 See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Chander & Sunder, supra 
note 1, at 1356; Shiva, supra note 284, at 2-3. 
295 See, e.g., TRIPS, art. 23 (giving heightened protection to alcoholic 
products that predominantly originate from Europe). 
296 See Hughes, supra note 17, at 1234. 
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information lies in the public domain. It is free to use without 
restriction by any and all-including by indigenous people. 
This latter stipulation is more than a rhetorical debating 
point. Whatever the rate at which TK is currently being 
appropriated by outsiders, it seems clear that, by any measure, 
indigenous peoples benefit from knowledge in the Western 
public domain to a much higher degree than Westerners benefit 
from TK. Any time indigenous peoples use the telephone, 
clothe themselves in modern textiles, consult a physician, 
check the weather forecast, access the internet, take penicillin 
or many other lifesaving medicines 297-they are taking 
advantage of the vast pool of information developed by 
Western civilization and bequeathed to the intellectual 
commons. 298 The benefits of such unrestricted Western 
innovations are not confined to technology. Indigenous 
peoples have long drawn inspiration from Western philosophy, 
arts, and literature. Authors in developing countries have also 
felt free to appropriate liberally-without compensation-from 
Western "classics" as inspiration for their own creative 
endeavors. Therefore, the accusation that TRIPS unfairly 
protects "rich world" knowledge while excluding "poor 
people's knowledge" is deeply misleading. At the very least, a 
full accounting of the benefits must go beyond merely 
comparing that category of information currently subject to 
private ownership. 
297 !d. at 1244 (citing statistic about 85% of WHO "essential meds" being in 
the public domain). 
298 It is true that some indigenous people still live in relative isolation from 
Western technology. Yet, they represent a very small minority of those 
who are currently asserting TK rights. 
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Accusations of legal imperialism surface in a different 
capacity that plays a more direct role in fueling resistance to 
subject matter differentiation. To many TK advocates, the 
construction of separate categories for technical TK versus 
cultural expression ignores the holistic nature of indigenous 
knowledge systems. By artificially imposing a schema 
derived from Western legal systems, such differentiation is 
seen as creating arbitrary distinctions that disrespect the 
integrity of indigenous culture. 299 
There are legitimate and unavoidable questions related 
to the propriety of using intellectual property law to regulate 
indigenous culture. Yet, the specific objection lodged here 
regarding subject matter differentiation arguably rests on a 
misunderstanding as to the nature of the distinctions being 
made. Intellectual property rights regulate unauthorized use of 
information goods. To say that different rules should govern 
technical knowledge versus cultural expression is not to 
proclaim any ontological distinctions regarding the underlying 
source material. It just means different uses are treated 
differently because the uses themselves differ in nature. 300 
To return to the shaman's flower example, our 
hypothetical stipulated that the context in which the shaman 
used the flower was accompanied by a series of expressive 
299 Of course, WIPO has already taken a big first step toward subject matter 
differentiation in adopting multiple treaties. Yet, such undercurrents of 
resistance may explain its reluctance to go significantly further down this 
path. 
300 Misunderstandings on this point derive from a tendency to reify property 
rights as synonymous with real-world objects. In fact, as modern property 
law scholars have emphasized, property rights merely speak to the 
entitlement of particular categories of users to engage in specific forms of 
use. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 257, at 981. 
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rituals richly imbued with cultural significance. To separate 
the legal consequences attaching to a pharmaceutical 
company's use of the flower-qua-knowledge from a musician's 
appropriation of the "healing song" sung as part of the same 
ritual does not imply that these TK elements constitute distinct 
forms of knowledge within the source culture itself. However, 
as we saw, these different facets of the indigenous healing 
ritual have very different meanings and value propositions to 
external appropriators. The pharmaceutical company is 
looking for useable knowledge as a shortcut to discover 
potential patentable drugs. The musician listens for 
esthetically interesting sounds that can be adapted or 
incorporated into a commercial music recording. Moreover, 
the nature of the end use differs dramatically: The 
pharmaceutical company will produce a pill in which 
indigenous source materials are all but invisible. By contrast, 
the traditional source material is much more likely to retain an 
identifiable and distinctive presence in the musicians' 
recording. 
A similar confusion sometimes arises with respect to 
conventional IP rights. We may speak colloquially about a 
smartphone being "patented" or a book being "copyrighted." 
Yet, this expression is merely a shorthand way of saying 
certain intangible aspects of these real-world objects are bound 
up in IP rights that restrict certain uses. In fact, the same object 
may be regulated by multiple overlapping layers of intellectual 
property rights. For example, a smartphone app may employ 
patented software code and rely on communications protocols 
covered by separate patents. The expressive elements that 
comprise the app's screen display could be covered by 
copyright, trade dress, design patents-or possibly all three. 
None of this is to deny the holistic nature of the underlying 
app, which itself represents yet another form of property-an 
intangible chattel that may be purchased from the app store. 
Vol. 20 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & 
TECHNOLOGY 
No. 01 
2016 Pager, Traditional Knowledge Rights and Wrongs 195 
We can understand the app as having a coherent existence, 
meaning, and value-separate and distinct from the IP rights 
applying to its components. So, too, we should not view the 
TK rights that govern specific uses of indigenous culture as in 
any way compromising the integrity of the underlying culture 
as a whole. 
More generally, it is worth underscoring that TK/TCE 
rights are largely intended to regulate uses outside the 
traditional community/context. As such, it is not unreasonable 
to ask source communities to operate within familiar structures 
established in global IP law. Doing so would allow for more 
predictable outcomes across national boundaries and reduce the 
costs of implementation. By contrast, imposing indigenous 
norms on the world would constitute a form of reverse 
imperialism. 301 
Furthermore, the anti-imperialist discourse that 
underpins much of the traditional knowledge agenda can itself 
be challenged as tinged with internalized assumptions of 
Western supremacy. Such discourse implicitly dismisses 
developing countries as incapable of innovation and presents 
them instead as passive repositories of information resources 
awaiting Western colonization. 302 By asserting ownership over 
301 Indigenous activists often object to "Western" conceptions of property 
displacing the customary norms of indigenous cultures. However, one can 
equally ask: why should indigenous norms be imposed on parties who are 
not themselves members of the indigenous community? 
302 See Sunder, supra note 203, at 104-109 (describing view of source 
communities as "wardens of knowledge"); Mark Schultz & Alec van 
Gelder, Creative Development: Helping Poor Countries by Building 
Creative Industries, 97 KY. L.J. 79, 89 (2008).at 89 ("In the current debate, 
innovation and creativity are effectively treated as the exclusive dominion 
of people in wealthy countries"). Indeed, the frequent linking of traditional 
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"their" traditions and heritage, developing countries aspire to 
be protagonists in the global knowledge economy. Yet, in 
many ways, tradition represents the antithesis of innovation, 303 
and propertizing tradition cuts against the progressive rationale 
that animates intellectual property rights. 304 Far from "striking 
a blow against imperialism," an uncritical embrace of the TK 
bandwagon risks validating its underlying assumptions of 
Southern incapacity and helplessness. 
The asymmetrical benefits of the global IP regime are a 
genuine problem. Yet, the TK agenda is largely a distraction 
from the work required to tackle such enduring inequalities at 
their source. Rather than clinging to heritage from their past, 
developing countries should redouble their efforts to promote a 
forward-looking culture of innovation and focus on building 
the institutional capacities required to support it. 305 The North-
South innovation gap, the digital divide, the development 
divide-none of these are written in stone, as the recent 
successes by many surging emerging economies demonstrate. 
Yet, rather than embracing the hard work of expanding on 
these hard-won successes, the push for broad TK protection has 
knowledge to biodiversity, suggests that Southern know-how is just another 
bio-resource for predatory Western corporations to hoover up. 
303 The very concept of tradition itself began an imperialist construct, 
making its re-appropriation as part of a counter-hegemonic campaign tinged 
with irony. "Traditional" was a synonym for "primitive"-the opposite of 
"modern"-used to refer to ahistorical cultures mired in superstition which 
needed the "civilizing" influence of modern, scientific Europeans to redeem 
them. See SHELLY ERRINGTON, THE DEATH OF PRIMITIVE ART AND OTHER 
TALES OF PROGRESS 13 (1998). 
304 See Beebe, supra note l, at 875. 
305 Chander & Sunder, supra note l, at 1371-72; Sean A. Pager, 
Accentuating the Positive: Building Capacity for Creative Industries into 
the Development Agenda for Global Intellectual Property Law, 28 AM. U. 
INT'L L. REV. 223, 252-53, 293 (2012). 
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consumed a disproportionate share of WIPO's institutional 
capacity. As a form of geopolitical theater, the symbolic luster 
of TK rights may offer a salve for Southern inferiority 
complexes. However, the tradeoff of dynamic potential for 
static protection that they entail could inhibit cultural and 
economic development and, ultimately, exacerbate the 
development divide rather than ameliorate it. 
None of this is to deny the existence of valid reasons to 
support a more narrowly tailored set of traditional knowledge 
rights along the lines elaborated above. Yet, to get there 
requires tamping down on anti-imperialist rhetoric and 
adopting a more pragmatic outlook. The only "victory" 
achieved by advancing an overbroad and unworkable set of TK 
rights would be one over common sense. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has criticized the WIPO draft treaties for 
their over-inclusive scope. It argues that the expansive rights 
that the draft treaties confer are both overbroad and internally 
contradictory. If implemented as presently configured, they 
would soon prove unmanageable in ways that produce 
perverse, unintended harms. The more likely outcome, 
however, is that the treaties will fail to issue at all, or will be 
reduced to a symbolic "soft law" document that lacks binding 
force. 
To avoid such preordained failure, this Article has 
urged WIPO negotiators to set their sights on a more modest 
set of rights, tailored by subject matter. Robust norms of 
informed consent and attribution would supply a common 
baseline protection. Such baseline norms would go a long way 
toward satisfying indigenous grievances. 
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Beyond that, rights in traditional heritage would be 
selectively and narrowly targeted based on the normative 
interests at issue. Under this asymmetric approach to TK 
rights, the thick governance required to safeguard cultural 
integrity would be distinguished from the benefit sharing 
regime required to address economic justice concerns. These 
divergent normative interests, in turn, correspond fairly closely 
to differences in subject matter. 
Non-traditional uses of technical knowledge are 
unlikely to raise cultural integrity concerns, because such 
knowledge is typically abstracted from its cultural context in 
ways that render it unrecognizable to the source community. 
However, asymmetries in the capacity to exploit such 
knowledge and the skewed distribution of benefits that results 
raise serious concerns over economic justice. The case for a 
benefit-sharing remedy is further bolstered by extrinsic policy 
interests in global health and environmental sustainability, both 
of which favor compensating source communities for use of 
their knowledge and bio-resources. 306 
Conversely, when it comes to traditional cultural 
expression, the reciprocal analysis applies. Concerns over 
cultural integrity are most salient in this context. By contrast, 
economic justice concerns are more attenuated, given the 
ability of source communities to derive benefits from 
commercialization even in the absence of a formal benefit-
sharing regime. Moreover, the extrinsic policy interests 
favoring benefit-sharing apply with much less force. 
Accordingly, this Article advocates jettisoning the 
current "all of the above" approach of the draft WIPO treaties 
306 See infra Part III -a(2)(b) and accompanying text. 
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and replacing it with a more modest package of rights that 
would narrowly tailor protection according to the interests most 
salient in each domain. Just as conventional intellectual 
property regimes provide very different protection to 
copyrights and patents, so too should the WIPO treaties 
differentiate much more sharply between technical knowledge 
and cultural expression. 307 
This Article has offered a roadmap for a bifurcated 
approach that would implement such asymmetric protection. 
Source communities would exercise robust control over 
inauthentic use of TCE/folklore; however, such veto-power 
would be restricted to local/regional contexts. Conversely, 
rights over technical TK rights would not confer ex ante veto-
power, but instead would function under a global liability 
regime requiring compensation to source communities. 
This more streamlined approach to TK protection 
would be far more likely to win the consensus approval needed 
to enact legally binding treaties as global norms. At the same 
time, this Article has also explored structural obstacles 
impeding such a pragmatic solution. The dynamics of WIPO 
negotiations have privileged political grandstanding and 
maximalist agendas over practical problem-solving. Anti-
imperialist rhetoric undermines the legitimacy and efficacy of 
the entire enterprise. Putting the Dinkas on a par with Disney 
and deeming the Navajo the equal of Novartis might be 
307 This is not to say that TK should replicate the same distinctions present 
in the conventional copyright and patent systems. Indeed, in one respect the 
approach advocated here would lead to an inverse outcome: whereas global 
copyright law is a much more globally harmonized system than patent law 
with reciprocal protection conferred automatically without formalities, this 
Article advocates such seamless global protection for technical TK, while 
localizing protection for cultural expression. 
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innocuous were the intent purely symbolic. Yet, too much 
diplomatic capital has been invested for a purely symbolic 
outcome to be satisfactory. To achieve binding treaties, 
negotiators need to get serious. 
TK negotiators should abandon their ambition to use 
TK rights as the vehicle to redress global inequality and focus 
instead on drafting a more modest set of treaties that focus 
narrowly on pragmatic goals: ensuring benefit-sharing for 
source communities, safeguarding cultural integrity, and 
preventing unfair competition. Tough choices will be required. 
Yet, there are also genuine gains to be had: Aiming to do less 
in the domain of TK rights would free up institutional 
bandwidth to concentrate on more effective capacity-building 
initiatives that tackle North-South inequality head on. Doing 
that would yield a more meaningful victory over imperialism in 
the end. 
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